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ABSTRACT
Wei, Wutao PhD, Purdue University, August 2018. Model Based Clustering Algorithms with Applications. Major Professor: Bowei Xi.
In machine learning predictive area, unsupervised learning will be applied when
the labels of the data are unavailable, laborious to obtain or with limited proportion.
Based on the special properties of data, we can build models by understanding the
properties and making some reasonable assumptions. In this thesis, we will introduce
three practical problems and discuss them in detail. This thesis produces 3 papers as
follow:
Wei, Wutao, et al. ”A Non-parametric Hidden Markov Clustering Model with
Applications to Time Varying User Activity Analysis.” ICMLA2015 (1)
Wei, Wutao, et al. ”Dynamic Bayesian predictive model for box oﬃce forecasting.”
IEEE Big Data 2017. (2)
Wei, Wutao, Bowei Xi, and Murat Kantarcioglu. ”Adversarial Clustering: A Grid
Based Clustering Algorithm Against Active Adversaries.” Submitted (3)
User Proﬁling Clustering Activity data of individual users on social media are
easily accessible in this big data era. However, proper modeling strategies for user
proﬁles have not been well developed in the literature. Existing methods or models
usually have two limitations. The ﬁrst limitation is that most methods target the
population rather than individual users, and the second is that they cannot model
non-stationary time-varying patterns. Diﬀerent users in general demonstrate diﬀerent
activity modes on social media. Therefore, one population model may fail to characterize activities of individual users. Furthermore, online social media are dynamic
and ever evolving, so are users activities. Dynamic models are needed to properly
model users activities. In this paper, we introduce a non-parametric hidden Markov

xi
model to characterize the time-varying activities of social media users. In addition,
based on the proposed model, we develop a clustering method to group users with
similar activity patterns.
Adversarial Clustering Nowadays more and more data are gathered for detecting and preventing cyber attacks. Unique to the cyber security applications, data
analytics techniques have to deal with active adversaries that try to deceive the data
analytics models and avoid being detected. The existence of such adversarial behavior
motivates the development of robust and resilient adversarial learning techniques for
various tasks. In the past most of the work focused on adversarial classiﬁcation techniques, which assumed the existence of a reasonably large amount of carefully labeled
data instances. However, in real practice, labeling the data instances often requires
costly and time-consuming human expertise and becomes a signiﬁcant bottleneck.
Meanwhile, a large number of unlabeled instances can also be used to understand the
adversaries’ behavior. To address the above mentioned challenges, we develop a novel
grid based adversarial clustering algorithm. Our adversarial clustering algorithm is
able to identify the core normal regions, and to draw defensive walls around the core
positions of the normal objects utilizing game theoretic ideas. Our algorithm also
identiﬁes sub-clusters of attack objects, the overlapping areas within clusters, and
outliers which may be potential anomalies.
Dynamic Bayesian Update for Proﬁling Clustering Movie industry becomes
one of the most important consumer business. The business is also more and more
competitive. As a movie producer, there is a big cost in movie production and marketing; as an owner of a movie theater, it is also a problem that how to arrange the
limited screens to the current movies in theater. However, all the current models
in movie industry can only give an estimate of the opening week. We improve the
dynamic linear model with a Bayesian framework. By using this updating method,
we are also able to update the streaming adversarial data and make defensive recommendation for the defensive systems.

1

1. INTRODUCTION
Unsupervised machine learning is a task to infer the latent structure from a set of unlabeled data. General speaking, there are three major clustering algorithms without
assumptions on data’s distribution. They are centroid based algorithms, connectivity
based algorithms, density based algorithms. However, since the data is unlabeled,
the inferred structure may not reﬂect its true underlying relationship. As a result,
if we directly apply those unsupervised learning methods to practical applications,
the prediction may not be satisfying. Furthermore, those inferred latent structure
could be diﬃcult to interpret. In practice, unsupervised learning is rarely applied in
industrial problems in order to generate forecast. However, for some of the problems,
the full training data’s label is expensive or impossible to obtain. We can only grab
a small proportion of the true label or the data’s label is extreme imbalanced. For
those cases, supervised learning, semi-supervised learning or some dimension reduction method may not be applicable. Thus, we have to apply unsupervised learning
to solve those problems.
If we know some information about the data and some mild assumptions could be
validated in the problem, we can build a model to support the clustering algorithm
to improve the performance of clustering result. We call this kind of algorithm as
model based algorithms. For example, the Gaussian mixture model (4) is one of the
simplist model and it can soft clustering the data from two Gaussian distributions.
The Model-based clustering (5) is a widely used clustering method. Nevertheless,
when we deal with time-varying data, there are very few models can be applied here.
In this thesis, we will introduce three model-based time varying clustering methods. For user proﬁle time series data, we are able to build a non-parametric hidden
Markov model for each individual and based on this model to cluster the users into
diﬀerent clusters. For cyber security data, since the labels are expensive and imbal-
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ance for normal and abnormal activities, the adversary agents can also change their
attack strategies, we cannot use a simple classiﬁcation method to identify those new
activities. As a result, we designed a framework for adversial clustering. Finally,
for forecasting purposes, we designed the forecasting method for streaming data and
present it in an application of box oﬃce forecasting. This forecasting framework
can be also applied to adversial clustering for time varying adversial monitoring and
clustering.

1.1

User Proﬁling and Clustering
With the growth of technology and storage, large user proﬁle datasets are much

more accessible nowadays. There are diﬀerent resources of user generated content:
Online shopping sites like Amazon, Ebay; social media like Facebook, Instagram,
Twitter; online repository societies like GitHub; online knowledge societies like Quora,
Stackoverﬂow, and Wikipedia. The usage of Internet increases the number of data
sources. When people browse, click or type, their activities will be sent to a certain
server, recorded and stored. To study those types of data, two key factors need to be
considered. One is users’ individual activity patterns, and the other is the interaction
between users. There are various published works on social network modeling that
focuses on user interaction. However, many models used for user proﬁling data are
neither suﬃcient nor accurate. When researchers study user activities, they often
assume one distribution model for all users. People with diﬀerent background and
diﬀerent interests may demonstrate drastically diﬀerent behaviors online. It is not
appropriate to assume one distribution or apply one model for all users. As a result,
there is still an urgent need to develop proper individual user proﬁle models and apply
the models to analyze large user generated data.
Although an individual user only generates a small amount of data, the total
amount of combined user activity data can be large. As discussed previously, there
exists a large variation between the activities of diﬀerent users, and it is usually
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improper to use one model to ﬁt all users. Instead, more ﬂexible models that can be
easily personalized should be used for modeling user activities.
Based on the model, users with similar activity patterns can be further clustered
by using clustering methods. Also as discussed previously, user activities are changing
over time, and thus are dynamic. Therefore, dynamic models are more preferable than
static models for characterizing user activities over time. In addition, seasonal eﬀects
or patterns are also needed to be properly modeled or removed before analysis.
In the ﬁrst part of this thesis, we propose a non-parametric hidden Markov model
for user proﬁle analysis. Based on the model, we further develop a model-based cluster
algorithm to cluster users into ﬁnite groups, within which users share similar activity
patterns. We validate the proposed model and algorithms with simulation study and
further apply them to analyze GitHub contributor data and Wikipedia editor data.

1.2

Adversarial Clustering
Increasingly data analytics techniques are being applied to large volumes of system

monitoring data to detect cyber security incidents. The ultimate goal is to provide
cyber security analysts with robust and eﬀective insights derived from big data. Unlike most other application domains, cyber security applications often face adversaries
who actively modify their strategies to launch new and unexpected attacks. The existence of such adversaries results in cyber security data that have unique properties.
Firstly, the attack instances are frequently being modiﬁed to avoid detection. Hence
a future dataset no longer shares the same properties as the current training dataset.
Secondly, when a previously unknown attack happens, security analysts need to respond to the new attack quickly without the help of readily labeled instances in their
database to assist their work. Thirdly, adversaries can be well funded and make big
investments to camouﬂage the attack instances. Therefore despite signiﬁcant eﬀort
invested by the domain experts, a vast majority of the instances in their database
may remain unlabeled. For example, a new malware can incorporate large amounts
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of legitimate code to masquerade as legitimate software and obfuscate its binary. In
other cases, it may become laborious and expensive to label an instance.
Thus data analytics techniques for cyber security must also have unique capabilities. They need to be resilient against the adaptive behavior of the adversaries, and
are able to quickly detect previously unknown and unlabeled new attack instances.
Hence, recently, various adversarial machine learning techniques have been developed
to counter adversarial adaptive behaviors. However those previous adversarial machine learning work is mostly under the main assumption of the availability of large
amounts of labeled instances (i.e., normal versus malicious objects). Although large
amounts of data are generated by the cyber security applications, we often have few
properly labeled instances to construct an eﬀective classiﬁer.
Given a large amount of unlabeled data, defender needs to capture the adversarial
behavior, identify suspicious instances as anomalies for a more detailed investigation,
and quickly respond to new attacks. However clusters identiﬁed by traditional clustering algorithms are likely mixed, since with a few attack objects, adversaries can
bridge the gap between two previously well separated clusters. Sometimes a handful
of labeled attack and normal instances are available. There are too few of them to
build a classiﬁer, yet they oﬀer valuable information about the adversaries. In this
paper, we develop a novel adversarial clustering algorithm so that we need only a few
labeled instances to build robust defensive algorithm against the attack objects. Our
algorithm can identify the centers of normal objects, sub-clusters of attack objects,
and the overlapping areas where adversaries have successfully placed the attack objects. We then draw defensive walls around the centers of the normal objects utilizing
game theoretic ideas. Our algorithm also identiﬁes outliers as potential anomalies and
outlying unknown clusters for further investigation.
Semi-supervised learning techniques also utilize information from both labeled
and unlabeled instances. Adversarial clustering and semi-supervised learning operate
under very diﬀerent assumptions. In adversarial settings, attackers purposely modify
the attack objects to make them similar to normal objects, though suﬀering a cost
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for doing so. Hence the assumptions commonly used for semi supervised learning
do not hold for adversarial clustering. Instead we observe that objects similar to
each other belong to diﬀerent classes, while objects in diﬀerent clusters belong to
the same class. In adversarial settings, within each cluster, objects from two classes
can overlap signiﬁcantly. Consequently, adversarial clustering and semi-supervised
learning techniques have very diﬀerent goals too. Semi-supervised learning aims to
assign labels to all the unlabeled objects with the best accuracy. Our adversarial
clustering algorithm aims to identify the overlapping regions, and the core areas of
the normal objects, within each cluster. The overlapping regions and outliers are not
labeled by our algorithm. We draw defensive walls around the centers of the normal
objects. The shape and the size of the defensive walls are determined through a game
theoretic study. Inside the defensive walls, we have nearly pure normal objects, despite
an increased error of blocking out the normal objects mixed with the attack objects
outside of the walls. Adversarial clustering draws an analogy to airport security. A
small number of passengers use the fast pre-check lane at the security checkpoint,
analogous to the normal objects inside the defensive walls. All other passengers must
go through more time consuming security check, analogous to the objects outside the
walls. The goal is not to let a single terrorist enter an airport, at a cost of blocking
out many normal objects. Meanwhile the ability to identify the overlapping regions
leads to a more focused security check procedure, where attack and normal objects
are similar to each other. We compare our algorithm with semi-supervised learning
algorithms in Section 4.3.
In the second part of this thesis, we will introduce the framework of adversial
clustering. This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.1, we present our
adversarial clustering algorithm. In Section 4.2, we conduct a game theoretic study
to examine the sizes and the shapes of diﬀerent defensive walls used in our adversarial
clustering algorithm. In Section 4.3, we evaluate our algorithm with simulated and a
network intrusion data sets.

6
1.3

Dynamic Bayesian Model Update
When we come across with streaming data, one of the crucial problems is how to

infer the dynamic and evolution of new cluster generation and cluster changes. Most
of current clustering algorithms focus on a snapshot of the clustering result. However,
the clusters do not remain the same along with time. For example, for cyber attack,
the adversaries may form a new pattern if they ﬁnd some defensive system defects.
After the security team ﬁx the issue, the new cluster may gradually demise. As a
result, it is important to design an inference approach to detect the cluster changes
within a short amount of time. It should also be able to leverage current knowledge
for the groups and update the clustering result with new evidence or information.
In the third part of this thesis, we propose a hybrid method based on Bayesian
forecasting theory and classic statistical learning techniques to predict box oﬃce. The
proposed method considers both movie attributes and actual oﬃce box data Based
on box oﬃce revenue data of a selected set of movies, a dynamic linear model (DLM)
is trained, to forecast box oﬃce of new movies.
Compared to the existing approaches, the proposed method is advanced in the
following aspects.
• The DLM trained with historical data can accurately depict dynamic dependencies on oﬃce box time series data, given classic attributes such as director,
cast, etc. The modeling strategy is to primarily eliminate the reliance on nonsalient features derived from other sources which may be noisy to ﬁt an accurate
model, and to further optimize model performance regarding actual incoming
revenue data.
• The model ﬁtting approach is in a Bayesian way so it does not depend on auxilliary data sources such as social media information which is usually diﬃcult
to clease. Compared to other time series modeling techniques, the proposed
method takes prior knowledge into consideration, which allows an early prediction of real-time box oﬃce.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1

User Proﬁling and Clustering
User proﬁle modeling was ﬁrst proposed in 1979 by Rich (6). Webb (7) intro-

duced online user modeling with machine learning in 2001. Barla (8) pointed out
that the most important information for user proﬁle modeling is users’ actions. Furthermore, by combining information from other multiple sources together, a richer
user proﬁle can be produced. For user proﬁle modeling, most current researches are
focused on feature selection or dimension reduction. For example, Badi etc. (9) identiﬁed key factors that aﬀect user document reading interest using factor analysis;
Arbelaitz etc. (10) selected the most signiﬁcant features of social media user activities and further used them to identify disabled people. In social network analysis,
the study of user activity varies. For example, Carmegnola etc. (11) proposed to
improve social recommender systems by adding user tags information; Benevenuto
etc. (12) developed a state model to characterize user behaviors in online social networks; Kim etc. (13) proposed to include network inﬂuence information in the user
behavior model to improve performance. In e-commerce area, data scientists are more
interested in purchase rate prediction and recommendation system construction; For
example, Qiu etc. (14) was applied scalable PCA to do clustering for Amazon entry data. Novak etc. (15) built a structural equation model for online purchasing
behavior; Jiang etc. (16) applied a novel associative classiﬁcation model to improve
customer satisfaction.
Since user may have diﬀerent work statuses, the model shall consider the state
changes. One important model with users’ status switch is hidden Markov model. The
hidden Markov model (HMM) was introduced by Baum in 1966 (17). It has been well
applied in the ﬁeld of temporal pattern recognition (18). Since the idea of postulating
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diﬀerent states and memorylessness is natural, HMMs were also used to model human
or animal behaviors. Montgomery etc. (19) used continuous HMMs to characterize
online browsing and purchasing activities over time; Nguyen etc. (20) tracked human
or animal movements and schedules by incorporating additional layers into HMM
to allow some common structures, and they referred to the resulting model as the
hierarchical hidden Markov model(HHMM). Langrock etc. (21) combined existing
models and used a two-layer hierarchical hidden semi-Markov model to ﬁt Bason’s
telemetry movement data. We also want to note that Deng etc. (22) proposed a
nonstationary HMM for speech recognition. Bansal etc. (23) was trying to apply
time varying data prediction to solve sluge bulking problem.
However, The HMMs discussed above either are not applicable for user activity
proﬁling or are not able to capture time-varying activity patterns. Thus, we shall
consider some nonparametic functions to ﬁt each state’s pattern. In numerical analysis, interpolation (24) is a method of smoothing and approximating the underlying
function with a discrete set of know data points. Spline interpolation (25) is a preferred way of applying interpolation. By usine diﬀerent types of piecewise polynomial
functions called splines as basis, it is able to approximate any types of continuous
functions. Among those spline interpolations, cubic spline (26), B-spline (27), Pspline (28) and smoothing spline (29) are several diﬀerent forms of constructing the
approximations. In this application, we only applied B-spline as an example. However, other spline functions are also able to be applied accordingly in this model. As
a result, we develop a novel non-parametric model based on hidden Markov chain
with applying several spline interpolation functions to approximate the user activity
pattern function. Then, instead of comparing the raw time series data, we cluster the
users’ activity pattern with deﬁne a similarity of the activity pattern models. The
result will be discussed in a latter chapter of this thesis.
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2.2

Adversal Clustering
Robust learning techniques have been proposed in the past, for example, to de-

feat poisoning attacks (30), purposely generated malicious errors (31), and missing or
corrupted features (32). Classiﬁcation in adversarial settings has also received considerable attention in the literature, e.g., (33; 34; 35; 36; 37). In (38; 39), Stackelberg
game is used to model the sequential actions between a defender/classiﬁer and active
adversaries. Adversarial classiﬁcation techniques were developed for the Facebook
social network to defeat the fake and spam accounts (40). However even with the
information obtained from a large training sample of labeled normal and attack objects, building a robust classiﬁer to block out the attack objects, which are constantly
being modiﬁed by adversaries to avoid detection, is not an easy task.
Compared with adversarial classiﬁcation, there is fewer work on adversarial clustering, which is a much harder learning problem. (41) considered the problem of
evaluating the security of clustering algorithms in an adversarial setting. (41) then
evaluated the security of single linkage hierarchical clustering algorithm under poisoning attacks and obfuscation attacks. (42) further studied the eﬀects of poisoning
attacks on complete linkage hierarchical clustering algorithm. (43) showed that a few
well-constructed attack objects could lead to a larger mixed cluster, and hence significantly reduce the eﬀectiveness of a clustering algorithm. (44) showed that subspace
clustering has a certain tolerance for noisy or corrupted data.
Semi-supervised learning techniques utilizes information from both labeled and
unlabeled instances. It has an extensive literature. In general there are two types of
semi-supervised learning techniques, semi-supervised classiﬁcation and semi-supervised
clustering. There are many diﬀerent approaches for semi-supervised classiﬁcation,
such as transductive support vector machine (TSVM), generative mixture models,
self-training and co-training. TSVM extends SVM to the semi-supervised learning
scenario. Labels are assigned to the unlabeled instances such that the classiﬁcation
boundary has the maximum margin on the original labels and newly assigned la-
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bels (e.g., (45; 46; 47)). TSVM avoids the high density regions, which may not be
the optimal solution when two classes are heavily overlapped. Under mixture model
assumption, EM algorithm is used for semi-supervised classiﬁcation (e.g., (48; 49)).
This approach allows the classiﬁcation boundary to go through the densest region of
the data points. However users need to pay attention to model identiﬁability issue and
whether the model assumption ﬁts the data or not (e.g., (50; 51; 52)). Self-training
approach iteratively assigns labels to new data points, and then includes both the existing labels and newly assigned labels to train another classiﬁer (e.g., (53; 54; 55)).
Co-training splits the available features into two sets and build two classiﬁers, each
using only one set of features. In an iterative process, each classiﬁer learns from the
other one with the most conﬁdent predicted labels (e.g., (56; 57; 58)).
Often semi-supervised clustering algorithms use pairwise must-link and cannotlink constraints. Must-links ensure the objects with identical labels are grouped
in the same cluster, while cannot-links ensure the objects with diﬀerent labels are
in diﬀerent clusters (e.g. (59; 60; 61)). Meanwhile many work extends K-means
algorithm to semi-supervised clustering settings (e.g., (62; 63; 64)). (65) developed
a hierarchical density based semi-supervised clustering algorithm. However if the
density varies signiﬁcantly among clusters, the algorithm has diﬃculty to extract the
natural cluster structure. (66) extends DBSCAN to semi-supervised settings. Instead
of having one set of values for the parameters as in DBSCAN, (66) ﬁnds multiple sets
of parameter values to better handle the situation when densities vary signiﬁcantly
among clusters.
Our adversarial clustering algorithm has a very diﬀerent goal. Compared with
semi-supervise learning, we do not label all the previously unlabeled objects and
attempt to achieve the maximum accuracy. Instead we identify the centers of normal
objects using defensive walls. We focus on having nearly pure normal objects inside
the walls, often at the expense of blocking out many normal objects mixed with
abnormal objects. Hence the overall accuracy of our algorithm may decrease but we
identify the center normal regions where the percentage of normal objects is much
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higher, and can be considered as relatively safe regions. We do not label the objects
in the regions where normal and abnormal objects are mixed. Instead we mark
out the whole mixed areas, where attacks take place and objects must be examined
carefully. We also leave unknown clusters and outliers unlabeled, since they should
be investigated carefully as being potential anomalies or a new attack.

2.3

Bayesian Update for Proﬁling Clustering
Bayesian statistics (67) is named after Thomas Bayes. Their inference method is

based on Bayes theorem (68) and the probability gets updated when new information
or evidence is available. Bayesian inference assumes that the randomness comes
from the parameters, while the data or evidence is ﬁxed. Comparing to frequentist
approach, the advantage of Bayesian statistics is (69) that it does not require a bunch
of thresholds in advance to formulate a valid hypothesis. Furthermore, by applying
priors, Bayesian inference is more robust to outliers, and the posterior can be updated
from time to time. However, some critiques (70) (71) (72) claim that Bayesian’s
prior selection is subjective and the calculation of posterior is complicated. However,
with the development of computational power and the invention of Markov Chain
Monte Carlo(MCMC) (73) and variational Bayesian inference algorithms, the latter
disadvantage becomes an advantage since it can approximate all the distributions.
Furthermore, if we have a high conﬁdence in prior selection, the subjection of priro
selection become a solid support in posterior update. As a result, Bayesian inference
is widely applied across machine learning areas.
Dynamic Linear Model(DLM) is a classic method that is commonly applied in
forecasting problems (74; 75). For instance, it’s been used for real-time prediction
on short-term freeway travel time, electricity price, stock price, etc (76; 77; 78; 79;
80). The common ground of these problems are that latent factors for an accurate
prediction are diﬃcult to ﬁnd or are too noisy to be used.
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The DLM based method used in this work is augmented by a Bayesian framework
and a dynamic ﬁltering method such that model coeﬃcients can be updated timely
with actual box oﬃce data. To consider seasonality and increment in box oﬃce time
series data, smoothing methods (1) are applied.
Movie industry has a signiﬁcant economic impact and pronounced inﬂuence on the
society and consumer life. According to a recent study, ﬁlm industry has contributed
146 billion Yuan to Chinese economy in the year of 2014, and that is 0.2% of the
national GDP (81). Though production and distribution of a movie can be timeconsuming and laborious, a ”blockbluster” produces tremendous gain to investors.
It has been proposed by industrial and academic researchers that prediction of box
oﬃce can give insights of how ﬁnancially successful a movie is, such that investors and
movie producers may properly plan movie budget, release time, number of screens,
etc., for maximum return of investment.
It has been argued about the diﬃculty of forecasting whether a ﬁlm is a supergross or a box oﬃce ﬂop before the ﬁlm goes on live. As an illustration, more than
241 million dollars were spent to produce 2015’s Sahara, while in the end the ﬁlm
barely made 122 million in return (82). The cost might have been avoided if there is
an accurate estimation on potential box oﬃce popularity of the ﬁlm.
Barry, in his pioneering work (83), argued that ﬁnancial success of a movie can be
implied by indicators such as whether the movie is a sequel, the presence of bankable
actors or directors, the movie’s MPAA ratings, the number of screens, etc. While
these factors may work for building a statistical prediction model, it relied on postrelease attributes of a movie that are cannot directly used for real-time or early-release
prediction.
Along with the proliferation of social media network, prediction model built upon
information collected from social media network was demonstrated eﬀective. For
instance, Sitaram and Bernardo proposed a method in (84) that counted number
of times that a movie is mentioned in Twitter to predict movie box oﬃce revenue.
Other work such as the one proposed by Krushikanth demonstrated a forecasting
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model based on social media information sourced from more diversiﬁed sites such as
IMDb, YouTube, and Wikipedia. Combined with classic movie features, the proposed
method proved a higher accuracy rate compared to the state-of-the-arts (85; 86; 87;
88; 89). However accurate these methods were, they worked for post-release prediction
when abundant movie reviews or massive societal opinions are available. In addition,
cleaning data and ﬁltering out relevant information for creating a good model is
proven hard.
As a result, we applied DLM with Bayesian inference approach to the application
of box oﬃce prediction problem. We proved that bayesian approach is able to forecast
the future trend and dynamic evolution for a particular model. Then we are able to
apply bayesian approach to other models to provide a better clustering update for
streaming or time varying data.
The proposed method was demonstrated on box oﬃce data of a set of representative movies (strategy of the selection process). Raw box oﬃce data was scraped from
The Numbers website (90). Movies for training the prediction model are selected
such that they are signiﬁcantly diversiﬁed in terms of movie attributes and box oﬃce
time series trend patterns. The aggregated data contains 50 movies, each of which
has box oﬃce data of 3 weeks. We believe this framework is able to apply to adversial
clustering and give it Bayesian update in model setting.
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3. USER PROFILING CLUSTERING
As we discribed before, user segmentation by their proﬁling is a hot topic in user
behavior research (91) and user segmentation studies (92). Those studies include
user information and behavior data in a particular time shot. However, when we are
facing the situation that we have to deal with evolving user proﬁle data, especially
user activities data, we have to build a model based on user behavior patterns, instead
of their daily performance. We can take Wikipedia editor activity data as an example.
Suppose we have an editor who performs on day 1 and takes rest on day 2; meanwhile,
we have another editor who rests on day 1 but contributes on day 2. If we assume
their amount of contribution is similar to each other, the traditional clustering or
even model-based clustering methods shall put them into diﬀerent clusters. However,
for those two editors, their editing pattern is similar and the only diﬀerence is their
working days. Thus, we have to build a model to deﬁne and accommodate those
time evolving user activity patterns, and this model can also be applied to cluster
user activities and behaviors. This is the motivation of the development of this user
proﬁling model.
In this section, we will introduce a non-parametric hidden Markov model for user
activity. This model is able to decribe user’s activity and make forecast under very
mild assumption, and based on this model, we can perform a two-layer clustering
method to group user together according to their behavior patterns.
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3.1

Model Description

3.1.1

Non-Parametric Hidden Markov Model for a Given Individual

Let X(t) be the amount of activities an individual generates at time t, where
t = 1, 2, . . . , T . We assume that there are d hidden states denoted as s0 , s1 , . . . , sd ,
respectively. In this paper, we will only focus on the case with d = 3. Note that it is
straightforward to extend the case with d = 3 to cases with d > 3. When d = 3, the
states represent 3 diﬀerent activity modes, which are the resting, moderately active,
and highly active modes, respectively. The resting mode means that a user has no
activity at the particular time. The moderately and highly active modes are assumed
to follow some distributions. Users are assumed to switch from one state to another
with certain probabilities as time changes. Let St be the actual state of the individual
at time t , and ajk ’s the transition probabilities from one state to another, where
ajk = P (St = sj |St−1 = sk ), for j, k = 0, 1, 2.
When the user is at the resting mode, the amount of activity the user generates is
assumed to be 0; when the user is at the moderately or highly active mode, the amount
of activity the user generates, which is called the emission function, is assumed to
follow the distributions G(F1 (t), θ1 ) and G(F2 (t), θ2 ), respectively. Note that G(·)
is the same speciﬁc distribution for both the moderately and highly active modes.
F1 (t) and F2 (t) are the nonparametric mean emission functions, which vary over time
capturing the dynamic patterns of the user’s activities. θ1 and θ2 are other parameters
associated with the moderately and highly active modes. In summary, the model we
propose can be written as follows.
X(t)|St = s0 = 0;
X(t)|St = s1 ∼ G(F1 (t), θ1 );
X(t)|St = s2 ∼ G(F2 (t), θ2 ).
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3.1.2

B-Spline Approximation

B-spline functions are a series of piecewise polynomial functions. They have explicit forms and can be determined by a given domain information and degrees. The
B-spline functions provide smooth approximation to the functional parameters such
as F1 (t) and F2 (t). In order to infer the mean emission functions F1 (t) and F2 (t),
we assume that they are smooth and can be represented by combinations of cubic
B-spline basis functions as follows:
Fi (t) =

K
X

i
(t), for i = 1, 2,
βki Bkp

k=1
i
where Bkp
(t) are the B-spline basis functions, βki are B-spline coeﬃcients, p is the

degree of B-spline basis functions. In this paper, cubic (p = 3) B-spline functions
will be applied. The B-spline basis functions can be generated iteratively and their
expression can be found in Knott’s book (93).
After using cubic B-spline approximations, the model becomes
X(t)|St = s0 = 0;
K
X
βk1 Bk1 (t), θ1 );
X(t)|St = s1 ∼ G(
k=1
K
X

X(t)|St = s2 ∼ G(

βk2 Bk2 (t), θ2 ).

k=1

3.1.3

EM Algorithm for Parameter Inference

In order to estimate the parameters of the model, the Expectation-Maximization
(EM) algorithm (4) will be applied. However, compared to the traditional BaumWelch algorithm, some important adjustments need to be made in the algorithm to
properly handle B-spline approximation functions. The major diﬀerence is to use an
iteratively reweighted least squares method to optimize the B-spline coeﬃcients of
the states. Furthermore, when the emission functions are discrete, the resting state
needs to be handled diﬀerently.
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In order to apply the EM algorithm, a complete likelihood function needs to be
obtained ﬁrst. Then, we calculate the expectation of the likelihood given the current
parameter estimates. After that, we maximize the marginal likelihood and obtain the
updates of the parameters. The process is performed iteratively until it converges.
Let φ = {π, A, τ }, where π is the initial probabilities of the states, A is the transition
matrix, and τ represents the parameters within the states. Then, the likelihood
function can be presented as follows:
P (X1 , X2 , . . . , XT ; φ) = ΠP(X1 )

T
Y

AP(Xt )1,

t=2

where Π is a vector with the initial probabilities for each state, P(Xt ) denotes a
diagonal matrix with the emission probability bj (t) = P (Xt |St = j), for j = 0, 1, 2,
and 1 is a column vector with all the entries equal to 1.
Given the current estimates of the parameters φold , the expected value of the
likelihood function can be obtained as follows.
Q(φ|φold ) =ES|X,φold [log P (φ; X, S)]
XX
=
p(S|X, φold ) log p(X, S|φ)
G

=

S

XX
G

p(S|X, φold ) log(p(s1 |π)

S

T
Y

[

p(st |st−1 , A)]

t=2

=

N
X

p(xt , B|st , β))

t=1
T X
N X
N
X

γt (si ) log πi +

i=1

+

T
Y

T X
N
X

ξt (si , sj ) log pij

t=2 i=1 j=1

γt (si ) log p(xt , B|β)),

t=1 i=1

where γt (i) = P (si |X, φ, t), ξt (i, j) = P (si , sj |X, φ, t), and β is the coeﬃcient set of
the B-spline basis functions.
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In order to get γt (i) and ξt (i, j), we have to calculate ut (i) = P (X1 , X2 , . . . , Xt , st =
i|φ) and vt (i) = P (Xt+1 , Xt+2 , . . . , XT |st = i, φ). According to the Markov properties,
they can be calculated by applying the Forward-Backward algorithm as follows.
ut+1 (j) = [

N
X

ut (i)aij ]bj (Xt+1 ); u1 (i) = πi bi (X1 ),

j=1

and
vt (i) =

N
X

aij bj (Xt+1 )vt+1 (j); vT (i) = 1,

j=1

where aij is the transition probability from state i to j, bj (t) is the emission probability
given the observation Xt .
Then, it is easy to get the following quantities:
γt (i) =

ut (i)vt (j)
N
P

,

ut (i)vt (j)

i=1

and
ξt (i, j) =

ut (i)aij bj (Xt+1 )vt (j)
N
P

.

ut (i)aij bj (Xt+1 )vt (j)

i=1

The, update the parameters by maximizing Q as follows.
φnew = arg max Q(φ|φold ).
φ

The updated parameters are
TP
−1

πi = γ1 (i) and aij =

ξt (i, j)

t=1
TP
−1

.
γt (i)

t=1

The last step is to update the B-spline coeﬃcients, and the objective function
P
for the observations becomes F (x, B|β) =
[(X − βBi (t))]2 . We can apply the
x

weighted least square method to minimize the objective function, using the weight
Wi (t, t) = γt (i). Then, the B-spline coeﬃcients for each state can be calculated as
follows.
β i = (BiT W Bi )−1 BiT W X
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where Wi is a diagonal matrix with diagonal entries Wii , Bi is a K ∗ T matrix with
entries Bti (k), and X is the observation vector. The entire process is iterated until it
converges.
Note, when updating βi , if there are too few non-zero activities in a certain time
period, we may come across with the singular matrix problem. There are two approaches to address this problem. One is to ﬁlter out the users with few non-zero
activities; and the other is to propose some regularization on βi . Furthermore, we set
one absolute zero state in our model. According to the result of Aitchison (94), if we
assume the distribution of G(·) is a continuous distribution, the unbiased estimator of
the ’zero’ ore resting state proportion is the proportion of the non-active time. As a
result, any absolute zero activities belong to the resting state. However, if we assume
that some of the states follow discrete distributions, zero-inﬂation might become a
problem. It is because that if we observe a time with zero amount of activity, it can
come from the resting state or from the other active states. Some publications have
discussed about using zero-inﬂated Poisson (95) and negative binomial (96) distributions. If these distributions are used, the emission probability for each state needs to
be adjusted so that the total conditional probability is equal to one.

3.1.4

Number of Knots and Label Switching Problem

In practice, the choice of the number of knots is critical. When there are too many
inner knots, the smoothness of the B-spline function cannot be guaranteed, and the
overﬁtting problem may appear. In the converse, if the number of the inner knots is
small, a label switching problem may occur (97).
Here, we use the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) (98) to help us determine
the number of knots. The formula of BIC is BIC = −2 ln L̂ + k ln(n), where L̂ is the
maximum likelihood of the model, k is the number of independent parameters, and
n is the number of data points. The ﬁrst term in the BIC formula favors large or
complex models, whereas the second term adds penalties to the size of the models (99).
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Therefore, BIC balances the achieved likelihood and the number of parameters in a
model to prevent underﬁtting and overﬁtting. Compared to the Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC), BIC penalizes the number of parameters more, which is more helpful
to reduce the number of redundant knots. In the model we use, adding one more inner
knot results in two more parameters. As a result, BIC leads to an adequate number
of knots while AIC usually leaves more redundant knots. Our experiments also verify
this conclusion as will be discussed later.
The label switching problem can occur in the estimation step of the EM algorithm
above. Sometimes, the ﬁtted mean emission function of the moderately active state
is greater than that of the highly active state, which is contradictory to our model
setting. We implement soft clustering in the EM algorithm, which is to allocate one
user activity at a time to multiple active modes, instead of hard clustering, which is
to allocate one user activity at a time to only one active mode. The advantage of
soft clustering is that it leads to better performance when clusters are close to each
other (100). The trade-oﬀ is that soft clustering may give rise to the label switching
problem. Fortunately, the label switching problem can be avoided or corrected by imposing the order constrain between the states. Furthermore, the EM algorithm may
converge to a local maximum and the results depend on the choice of initial value.
There are diﬀerent approaches to addressing this issue. We ﬁnd one technique eﬀective, which is to cluster the data into categories and use the means of the categories
as the initial starting points.

3.1.5

Finite Mixture Hidden Markov Model for Clustering

In the previous section, we have proposed the nonparametric hidden Markov model
for individual users. Some users may have similar activity proﬁles. As a result, it is
natural to group those users into groups. In this section, we further use the proposed
model to cluster similar users into groups. Each cluster’s centroid can be interpreted
as the average proﬁle of the group.
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The clustering process can be integrated with the model ﬁtting algorithm proposed
in the previous section. It can be implemented by a two-layer EM algorithm as follows:
The top layer is to perform clustering, in particular to calculate the proportions of the
clusters; and the bottom layer is to ﬁt the individual nonparametric hidden Markov
models of the clusters.
We ﬁrst obtain the complete likelihood function in the beginning of the two-layer
EM algorithm. Then we will perform the E-step for the top layer. After that, we
focus on each cluster of the bottom layer and perform the E-step and M-step, which
are very similar to those procedures discussed in the previous section. Finally, we
perform the M-step for the top layer. The process is iterated until it converges.
Let θ = {α, φ}, where α = {α1 , α2 , . . . , αR } contains the proportions of the cluster, R is the number of clusters, and φ = {φ1 , φ2 , . . . , φR } contains the vector of
parameters of the clusters. For cluster r, φr = {πr , Ar , τr }, where πr is the initial distribution, Ar is the transition matrix, and τr represents the parameters of the states.
Our model consists of two layers: The top is the clustering layer, and the bottom is
the nonparametric hidden Markov model layer. The complete log likelihood function
is
P (X1 , X2 , . . . , XT ; φ) = ΛΠP(X1 )

T
Y

AP(Xt )1,

t=2

where Λ denotes a diagonal matrix with the diagonal entries equal to α, other matrices
are deﬁned in similar ways as the previous section.
In the E-step of the top layer, we compute the following quantities
αr
ζnr =

n
P

t=1
n P
n
P

γnr (t)

αr γnr (t)

r=1 t=1

, r = 1, 2, . . . , R.
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Next, we carry out the E-step of the bottom layer. In each cluster, there is one
hidden Markov model as discussed before, so we have the log likelihood for diﬀerent
θ as follows:
Q(θ|θold ) =

XX

=

XX

G

G

[

=

N
Y

n=2
R
X

αp(S|X, θt−1 ) log p(X, S|θ)

S

αp(S|X, θt−1 ) log(p(s1 |π)

S

p(sn |sn−1 , P )]

N
Y

p(xm , B|sm , β))

m=1

αr [

K
X

γ(s1k ) log πk

r=1

+

k=1
N
K
K
XXX

ξ(sn−1,j , snk ) log pjk

n=2 j=1 k=1

+

N X
K
X

γ(snk ) log p(xn , B|β))],

n=1 k=1

where γr (sn ) = p(sn |X, θold ) and ξr (sn,t−1 , sn,t ) = p(sn,t−1 , st |X, θold ). Now, we start
to carry out the M-step. First we update the following quantities,
γrt (i) =

urt (i)vrt (j)
N
P

,

urt (i)vrt (j)

i=1

and
ξrt (i, j) =

urt (i)arij brj (Xr,t+1 )vrt (j)
N
P

.

urt (i)arij brj (Xr,t+1 )vrt (j)

i=1

When maximizing Q(θ, θold ) with respect to θ, we can treat α, γ(sn ) and ξ(sn−1 , sn ) as
constants. It is easy to derive the following quantities by using Lagrangian multipliers.
N
P

πrk =

ζnr γr1 (k)
n=1
N P
K
P

ζnr γrj (k)

n=1 j=1
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and

N P
T
P

prij =

ζnr ξr,t−1 (n, j)

n=1 t=2
N P
K P
T
P

.
ζnr ξr,t−1 (n, j)

n=1 l=1 t=2

Based on the B-spline mean functions, we can apply the least squares estimation
method to the objective function and use the top layer to re-weight the weight matrix
Wri (t, t) = γt (i)ζnr . Then, the B-spline coeﬃcients of each state are obtained as
follows.
T
T
β ri = (Bri
Wri Bri )−1 Bri
Wri X.

In the end, we return to the top layer to update α as follows.
N
1 X
ζnr .
αr =
N n=1

The algorithm runs iteratively until it converges.

3.2

Simulations
Based on the propose models, we carry out two simulation studies with constant

and quadratic mean functions. For each state, we set the distribution to be Gaussian.
For the constant means, we set the moderately active state mean as 5 and the highly
active state mean as 10. For the quadratic mean functions, we set the moderately
active state mean as F (x) = 12 x2 and the highly active state mean as F (x) = x2 .
The simulation results are summarized by the plots presented in Figure 3.1. From
the simulation results, it can be observed that our algorithm has captured the trend
for each state well.

3.3

Applications

3.3.1

GitHub Contribution Data

GitHub is a distributed revision control repository hosting service provider. It
has more than 3 million users and 10 million repositories. It records the users’ daily
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Figure 3.1. Simulation results: the left one has constant mean functions and the right one has quadratic mean functions. The red dots
are the simulated output for an individual. The blue line and green
line are the estimated mean functions of medium and high state.
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amount of repositories called contribution. By applying our model with the assumption that each user’s everyday contribution follows the Poisson distribution, we are
able to get every individual ﬁtted into our model. Again, the bottom state is the
resting state, which is always zero. For the Poisson distribution, we have to deal with
the zero inﬂation problem because The Poisson distribution is discrete and the ”zero”
contribution can come from either the resting state or the other two states. Thus,
we need to adjust the emission rates to get the marginal probability summed to one.
Figure 3.2 reports the estimated mean contributions of the three state of of the user
named ”hadley”, who is the most signiﬁcant contributor to the topic of Statistics.
From the plot, it can be observed that the estimated functions captures the peaks of
the highly active state and the valleys of the moderately active state fairly well. The
estimated mean contribution function demonstrate increasing patterns indicating the
expansion of the overall contribution to the topic of Statistics during that period of
time.

3.3.2

Wikipedia Editor Activity Data

Wikipedia is a collaboratively edited, multilingual, free Internet encyclopedia
founded in 2001 (101). The time-varying editor activity data was obtained from
our collaborators (102). It contains all the Wikipedia editors’(about 20 million) editing records from 2001 to 2010. Each editor’s activities are recorded weekly in the
term of Delta score, which is a metric that measures the contribution of the editor.
Delta score balances the inserting and deleting activities and it can be added up to
measure all the contribution for a user to the Wikipedia society. It can be calculated
by
Delta(u, v) = max(I, D) −

1
min(I, D) + M
2

where I is the total amount of inserted text, D is the total amount of deleted text,
and M is total amount of relative exchange of text positions (a measure of text
reordering) (103). The idea of this score is that every word that is inserted or removed
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Figure 3.2. The three-state mean plot of GitHub user ”hadley”. The
red dots are his number of contribution. The blue line and green line
are the mean estimate of medium and high state.
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Table 3.1. A Table of Comparing BIC with 3 Wikipedia Editors Model Fitting
N=4

N=5

N=6

ID
AIC

BIC

AIC

BIC

AIC

BIC

1

177.4 202.7 174.0 199.9 178.2 205.4

2

200.2 225.4 202.6 228.6 205.0 231.8

3

171.0 196.0 167.2 193.2 175.1 201.9

contributes 1 to the score and every word that is replaced contributes 1/2. The
motivation of doing this is to keep everyone’s contribution positive. Consider the
scenario as follows: an user ui writes a new paragraph and makes contribution of
k, and another user ui+1 rewrites all of ui ’s paragraph completely. If we treat the
replacement part as full, the contribution diﬀerence between ui+1 and ui−1 is k as
well. As a result, the overall contribution of user ui is 0. In order to avoid this case,
the replacement contribution should be considered as 1/2.
We choose the editors who have at least 30 weeks of activities, and segment their
major tenures. Then the proposed model and algorithm in this paper is applied to
each individual editor. We study the last two years of editors’ activities and use them
to determine the number of inner nodes for the B-spline functions. The results are
reported in Figure 3 and Table 1.
From Figure 3.3 and Table 3.1, it is obvious that the optimal number of inner
node in this application is N = 5. Some label switching problems happen at N = 4
or 6 for user 1 and 3. Both AIC and BIC choose N = 5 and there is no label switching
problem at N = 5.
After determining the number of inner nodes, we are able to identify the users with
similar work patterns use our model-based clustering method. We choose 500 editors
randomly with at least 30 weeks of activities and apply the clustering algorithm to
cluster them into 9 groups. The result is presented in log scale. The horizontal axis
is the number of weeks and the vertical axis presents the natural log transformed
delta score. The log transformation is applied to normalize the user activity amount.
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Figure 3.3. The three-state mean function plots of sample Wikipedia
users: the comparison of diﬀerent number of inner nodes
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Based on the previous analysis, we select 5 inner nodes and obtain the mean functions
in Figure 3.4. From the plots, we can clearly distinguish diﬀerent patterns. For
examples, Cluster 1 represents the editors with overall low output of activities, Cluster
3 represents the users with a drifting pattern, indicating that they decrease their
contribution over time, and Cluster 9 represents the users with a rising pattern,
indicating that they increase their contribution as time goes on.Similar explanations
can be applied to other groups. From observing the user proﬁles, we ﬁnd that the
majority part of users in cluster 1 are bots, which proves that our clustering method
makes sense to time-varying user activity clustering.
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Figure 3.4. The three-state mean function plots of 9 Wikipedia editor
activity clusters from a sample of 500 high motivated users
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4. ADVERSARIAL CLUSTERING
In cyber security applications, adversaries actively manipulate the objects under their
control to break through a defensive algorithm. Hence the properties of the data under
attack are drastically diﬀerent from those without attacks. Even though the normal
population remains unchanged, the adversaries can inject a small amount of attack
objects to ﬁll in the gap between abnormal clusters and normal clusters, and make
previously relatively pure normal clusters mixed, as pointed out in (43; 41; 42).
Traditional clustering algorithms are able to identify clusters and a few outliers.
Without any labeled instances, that is the only result we can expect, without knowing
whether a cluster is mixed, or nearly purely normal or abnormal. If a large number
of labeled instances are available, we can build a classiﬁer with a well deﬁned classiﬁcation boundary that separates the normal and attack objects within mixed clusters,
and separate the relative pure normal clusters from the attack objects.
In this chapter we consider a scenario where there are a large number of unlabeled
instances and only a handful of labeled instances, the number labeled being far less
than the number of unlabeled ones. A classiﬁer created using too few labeled objects
is very inaccurate when being applied to the large number of unlabeled ones. On
the other hand clusters produced by traditional clustering algorithms cannot provide
normal/attack information, and are useless. Therefore we develop a grid based defensive clustering algorithm, which is able to utilize the handful of labeled objects,
identify relatively pure normal and abnormal clusters, identify normal and abnormal
sub-clusters within a mixed cluster and their overlapping area, and further identify
outliers and outlying unknown clusters which need more eﬀort to investigate their
properties.
A classiﬁer with a well deﬁned classiﬁcation boundary is analogous to a point
estimate. When the sample is too small (i.e., too few labeled instances), a point
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estimate is way too inaccurate. Hence our clustering algorithm identify an overlapping
area between the normal sub-cluster and the abnormal, analogous to a conﬁdence
band.
Furthermore we draw defensive walls inside the relatively pure normal clusters
and the normal sub-clusters to identify the normal core position. When a large
number of labeled instances are available, a classiﬁcation boundary is a defensive
wall against the adversaries, since it blocks out the attack objects. Facing active
adversaries, a classiﬁer needs to be more conservative, i.e., a classiﬁcation boundary
is pulled back toward the center of the normal population, as shown in (37). With a
large number of unlabeled instances, our adversarial clustering algorithm oﬀers more
valuable information, since both normal and abnormal population can have multiple
sub-populations, and they will be identiﬁed as clusters/sub-clusters. Our adversarial
clustering algorithm then plays a conservative strategy as well, drawing defensive
walls to identify the normal core position. All objects outside of the walls need to be
examined carefully. In Section 4.2, we conduct a game theoretic study, utilizing the
equilibrium information to determine the sizes of the defensive walls. (3)

4.1

Adversarial Clustering Framework

4.1.1

A Grid Based Defensive Clustering Algorithm

Since cyber security applications often produce big datasets, we need a computationally eﬃcient algorithm, which should be easy to tune as well. Inspired by a
traditional grid based clustering algorithm (104), we develop a grid based defensive
clustering algorithm (GDClust). Utilizing the information from a handful of labeled
instances, our algorithm GDClust takes two passes over selected steps in each pass.
Overall there are ﬁve steps.

Step 1.

Initialization: For every variable Xi , i = 1, ..., q, divide its range

[min(Xi ), max(Xi )] into mi equal sized sections. We choose the number mi to ensure
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each section has roughly 5% to 10% of the data points. For diﬀerent variables, the
number of sections mi can be diﬀerent. Hence in the q−dimensional space, the sections
along each dimension together form small q−dimensional cells. Given a particular
cell, we call the cells in its hypercube neighborhood with radius 1 as its neighbor cells.

Step 2. Thresholding: Compute the distance threshold RT and the density
threshold DT as follows.
• Distance Threshold RT: For a data point p in cell c, we compute the pairwise distances d(p, o) between p and all the points in cell c’s neighbor cells. For
point p let a(p) = mean(d(p, o)) be the average of all the pairwise distances. Let
d(c) = mean(a(p)) be the average over all the points in cell c. RT =

mean(d(c))
.
q×coef RT

• Density Threshold DT: For a data point p in cell c, its density n(p) is the
number of points within the distance threshold RT from the data point p. A
cell c’s density is n(c) = mean(n(p)), the average of the densities of the points
in cell c. The density threshold DT =

mean(n(c))
lg(N )

× coef DT , where N is the total

number of data points.
Step 3. Weighting: We build a Gaussian kernel classiﬁer with the handful labeled data points. Normal objects are labeled as 1s and abnormal as 0s. We then
apply the Gaussian kernel classiﬁer to the unlabeled objects. Each unlabeled points
p is assigned a probability score bp ∈ [0, 1]. A positive weight scalar k is used to map
the scores bp from [0,1] to [-k,k].

Step 4. Clustering: Use each point’s re-weighted density n(p) × bp in the ﬁrst
pass, or directly use its density n(p) in the second pass. First take the points whose
density/re-weighted densities are greater than density threshold DT as cluster centroids. Merge the remaining points with the cluster centroids if their distances to a
cluster centroid is less than distance threshold RT. If a point’s distance to multiple
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cluster centroids are less than RT, then those small clusters are merge into one big
cluster. Continue to merge.

Step 5. Clustering the remaining data points: Remove all the likely normal and
likely abnormal clusters. For the remaining data points, use their original density
n(p). Cluster the remaining data points.

Our algorithm GDClust then takes the following two passes.

First Pass: Run the algorithm with only step 1, step 2, step 3, and step 4. Use
data points’ re-weighted density in step 4. After the ﬁrst pass, we identify likely normal and likely abnormal clusters among the data points. The remaining data points
are not clustered.

Second Pass: Using the same RT , DT , and k parameter values, run the algorithm with only step 4 and step 5. In step 4, we use every data point’s original density
n(p). All the data points are either grouped into clusters without label, or become
unlabeled outliers. Combined with results from the ﬁrst pass, and the clusters of
the remaining data points, now we are able to identify big mixed clusters which contain likely normal and likely abnormal sub-clusters and their overlapping areas. The
points in the overlapping region are not labeled. If there are remaining unlabeled
clusters, they are outlying unknown clusters. If there are remaining unlabeled and
unclustered data points, they are outliers, i.e., potential anomalies.

There are three tuning parameters. coef RT , coef DT and weight scalar k. k
is related to the size of the overlapping region, as shown later in Section 4.3. In
Section 4.3, we set coef RT = 20 and coef DT = 0.95, which achieve good results.
Since the size of the overlapping area is related to our choice of the weight, as
shown in Section 4.3, we draw defensive walls inside the normal clusters/sub-clusters
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after the second pass. By further blocking out the likely normal objects on the
periphery, we play a conservative strategy to identify the core positions of the normal
objects. The size of the defensive walls is also a crucial factor in our adversarial
clustering technique. Very small defensive walls tightly around the center of the
normal would block out too many normal objects along with the attack objects.
Next we examine two types of defensive walls.

4.1.2

Euclidean and Manhattan Defensive Walls for the Normal Core
Position

We consider two types of defensive walls around the centroids of the identiﬁed
normal objects. One is based on Euclidean distance and the other is based on Manhattan distance. The two plots of Fig. 4.1 show the Euclidean defensive walls, and
Fig. 4.2 two plots show the Manhattan defensive walls.
Based on Euclidean distance, the ﬁrst type of defensive walls form an ellipsoid
shaped region. Assume p variables Xp×1 are joint normally distributed, the (100α)%
conﬁdence region of X (0 < α < 1) is (X − µ
~ )0 Σ−1 (X − µ
~ ) = χ2p (α), where (X −
µ
~ )0 Σ−1 (X −~µ) is weighted squared Euclidean distance. We compute the sample mean
vectors µ̂g and the sample variance-covariance matrices S g of the identiﬁed normal
objects in a likely normal sub-cluster. Notice actual variables in a dataset need not
follow multivariate normal distribution. Inspired by the above conﬁdence region, we
construct a Euclidean defensive wall as follows
(X − µ̂g )0 S g,−1 (X − µ
ˆg ) = χ2p (α).
We choose the value of α, 0 < α < 1, to control the size of an ellipsoid shaped
defensive region.
The second type of defensive walls we use in our adversarial clustering technique is
based on Manhattan distance. The Manhattan defensive walls form a diamond shaped
region around the centroids of the clustered likely normal objects. Here we compute
the sample standard deviations σ
ˆig and sample means µ̂ig for each variable from the
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identiﬁed normal objects in a likely normal sub-cluster. A Manhattan defensive wall
is built as follows,
p
X
|Xi − µ̂g |
i

i=1

ˆig
σ

= η.

The value of η controls the size of a Manhattan defensive wall. The diamond shaped
Manhattan defensive wall has vertices at µ̂gi ± ηˆ
σig along each dimension.
We implement the following procedure to set the value of η. Using the sample
mean vector µ̂g and the sample variance-covariance matrix S g from the identiﬁed
normal objects in a likely normal sub-cluster (i.e., the values obtained for a Euclidean
wall), we generate a large sample from N (µ̂g , S g ). We then compute η(α) as a function
of α (0 < α < 1). For an η(α), (100α)% of the generated sample points fall into the
diamond shaped Manhattan region with vertices at µ̂gi ± η(α)ˆ
σig on each dimension.
Thus the values of η(α)s are more closely spaced around the centroids for smaller αs,
and the spacing increases with bigger α values.
The sizes of the defensive walls are crucial. In Sec 4.2, we conduct a game theoretic
study to provide guidelines about the equilibria αs and η(α)s under various attack
scenarios.

4.2

A Game Theoretic Study for the Size of Defensive Walls
In this game theoretic study, we focus on how defender being a leader versus being

a follower aﬀects its equilibrium strategies, and consequently the sizes of equilibrium
defensive walls. Often there are several non-cooperative adversaries that attempt to
break through a defensive algorithm. Therefore we consider the following scenario.
There is one defender with utility function D(h), and there are m adversaries, each
with utility function Ai (ti ), i = 1, · · · , m. h and ti are strategies in the corresponding
players’ strategy spaces H and Si .
Assume the defender controls the normal population π g , and each adversary controls a population πib , i = 1, · · · , m. Each of the normal population and the adver-
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Figure 4.1. One attacker with log utility function. Up to down: 1)
Defender as Leader: αle = 0.29, tel = 0.78; 2) Defender as Follower:
αfe = 0.95, tef = 0.20
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Figure 4.2. One attacker with log utility function. Up to down: 1)
Defender as Leader: ηle = 2.17, tel = 0.52; 2) Defender as Follower:
ηfe = 3.33, tef = 0.03
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Figure 4.3. One attacker with linear utility function. Up to down: 1)
Defender as Leader: αle = 0.46, tel = 0.72; 2) Defender as Follower:
αfe = 0.85, tef = 0.39
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Figure 4.4. One attacker with linear utility function. Up to down: 1)
Defender as Leader: ηle = 2.03, tel = 0.54; 2) Defender as Follower:
ηfe = 2.52, tef = 0.34
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Figure 4.5. One attacker with exponential utility function. Up to
down: 1) Defender as Leader: αle = 0.83, tel = 0.63; 2) Defender as
Follower: αfe = 0.94, tef = 0.23
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Figure 4.6. One attacker with exponential utility function. Left to
right: 1) Defender as Leader: ηle = 2.52, tel = 0.53; 2) Defender as
Follower: ηfe = 2.89, tef = 0.20
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saries’ populations may consist of multiple sub-populations, i.e. a player controlling
a mixture population. Hence there may exist g clusters of objects with g ≥ m + 1.

4.2.1

Adversarial Multi-Leader-Follower Stackelberg Game

As naturally the defender and the attackers observe each other’s actions, we model
the scenario as an adversarial multi-leader-follower Stackelberg game. In the game the
attackers and the defender act sequentially, one group being the leaders and another
being the followers. The leaders choose their strategies ﬁrst, and then after observing
the leaders’ actions, the followers choose their strategies. Each follower maximizes
its utility under the Cournot assumption that the other players hold their current
strategy. Each leader acts considering the aggregate followers reaction, assuming no
response from other leaders. Every player knows who are the leaders and who are the
followers. And players have complete knowledge of each other.
Defender being the leader: This is a one-leader-m-follower game. Following the
setup in (105; 106), we solve for an equilibrium of the game as follows.
1. Given a leader’s strategy h ﬁxed, assume the m adversaries’ (i.e., the followers’)
strategies are the attacks T = (t1 , · · · , tm ). For the i-th adversary, further
assume all other adversaries’ strategies are ﬁxed, i.e., ﬁxed tj , ∀j 6= i.
Solve the following optimization for thi :
thi = argmax{ti ∈Si } {Ai (ti , h)}
2. With the solution from above, T h = (th1 , · · · , thm ) is the m adversaries’ joint
optimal attacks for a given defender strategy h, the defender solves another
optimization problem.
he = argmax{h∈H} {D(th1 , · · · , thm , h)}
e

e

Then (he , th1 , · · · , thm ) is an equilibrium strategy for all players in the game.
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In a Stackelberg game, the leader can predict the followers’ strategies and then
decide its own optimal response. Hence this can be interpreted as the defender sets
the equilibrium for all players in the game.
Defender being the follower: This becomes a m-leader-one-follower game. Following the setup in (107), which is an extension of (105; 106), we solve for an equilibrium of the game as follows.
1. Given the joint attacks from the m adversaries, T = (t1 , · · · , tm ), solve for the
defender’s optimal strategy.
hT = argmax{h∈H} {D(t1 , · · · , tm , h)}
2. With the solution above as the defender’s optimal strategy hT against joint
attacks T = (t1 , · · · , tm ), solve for the optimal joint attacks T e .
e

T =

(te1 , ..., tem )

= argmax{ti ∈Si ,∀i}

m
X

Ai (ti , hT )

i=1
e

Then (hT , te1 , · · · , tem ) is an equilibrium strategy for all players in the game.
The attackers as a whole is the leader in the game. They act non-cooperatively
to choose their strategies. The attackers in this setup can be very diﬀerent from one
another. Together they set the equilibrium of the Stackelberg game.

4.2.2

Attacks Under Gaussian Mixture Populations

We then consider the following attack scenario to obtain insights about how
large the defensive walls become at an equilibrium and how they are aﬀected by
the defender’s role in the game. Assume p variables are measured from each object,
X = (X1 , ..., Xp ). First assume every population follows a single multivariate Gaussian distribution. Let the normal population π g follows Np (µg , Σg ). Let an adversarial
population πib follows Np (µbi , Σbi ) before launching attacks.
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Figure 4.7. Three attackers each with log utility functions. Up to
down: 1) Defender as Leader: αle = 0.71, ~tel = (0.58, 0.65, 0.59); 2)
Defender as Follower: αfe = 0.89, ~tef = (0.43, 0.56, 0.39)
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Figure 4.8. Three attackers each with log utility functions. Up to
down: 1) Defender as Leader: ηle = 1.63, ~tel = (0.66, 0.00, 0.67); 2)
Defender as Follower: ηfe = 3.16, ~tfe = (0.11, 0.00, 0.13)
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Figure 4.9. Three attackers each with linear utility functions. Up to
down: 1) Defender as Leader: αle = 0.38, ~tel = (0.72, 0.78, 0.78); 2)
Defender as Follower: αfe = 0.88, ~tef = (0.44, 0.58, 0.45)
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Figure 4.10. Three attackers each with linear utility functions. Up
to down: 1) Defender as Leader: ηle = 0.35, ~tle = (0.91, 0.00, 0.94); 2)
Defender as Follower: ηfe = 3.45, ~tfe = (0.08, 0.00, 0.98)
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Figure 4.11. Three attackers each with exponential utility functions.
Up to down: 1) Defender as Leader: αle = 0.20, ~tel = (0.80, 0.89, 0.78);
2) Defender as Follower: αfe = 0.89, ~tef = (0.44, 0.58, 0.41)
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Figure 4.12. Three attackers each with exponential utility functions.
Up to down: 1) Defender as Leader: ηle = 0.56, ~tel = (0.86, 0.01, 0.88);
2) Defender as Follower: ηfe = 1.85, ~tef = (0.52, 0.01, 0.58)
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When an adversary launches an attack t, it moves the objects under its control
toward µg , the center of the normal population. An object X is transformed by attack
t and becomes
X t = µg + (1 − t) × (X − µg ).
Notice 0 ≤ t ≤ 1. t = 1 is the strongest attack, since all the transformed objects
equal to µg , the center of the normal population, and t = 0 means no attack. Under
attack t, the population controlled by an adversary becomes
N ((1 − t)µb + tµg , (1 − t)2 Σb ).
Here we consider the scenario where the objects under the adversary’s control are
moved by the same factor t.
The joint attack from the m adversaries, i.e. the adversaries’ strategies, is then
(t1 , · · · , tm ), ∀ti ∈ [0, 1]. The defender’s strategy is to build a defensive wall around
the center µg of its population. A Euclidean defensive wall is controlled by a factor α
and a Manhattan defensive wall is controlled by η(α), α ∈ (0, 1). Hence a defender’s
strategy is h = α or h = η(α), depending on the type of defensive walls it uses.

4.2.3

Utility Functions

In this game theoretic study, we deﬁne the defender’s utility based on error rates
of normal objects and adversary objects, which are between 0 and 1, and their corresponding misclassiﬁcation costs. We let the misclassiﬁcation cost of normal objects
to be 1 and the misclassiﬁcation cost of adversary objects to be c. It is multiplied by
−100 so that the defender tries to maximize its utility in the game.
D(h) = −100(error-of-normal + c × error-of-adversary)
Defender utility D(h) is equivalent to D(α) or D(η(α)), since error rates are functions
of α or η(α).
Let k be the maximum utility of an adversary object when it passes a defensive
algorithm without the need of being modiﬁed. ||X t − X||2 , the L2 distance between
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the original object and the modiﬁed object once an attack t is launched, measures
how much an adversary object is moved towards normal. The minimum utility of an
adversary object is 0, either caused by heavy modiﬁcation or being blocked by the
defensive algorithm. Moving an adversary object towards normal is penalized. For
the adversaries, we consider three utility functions with increasing level of penalties
for launching an attack. The three utility functions are the expected values of a
penalized adversary object if it passes the defensive algorithm after being moved
towards normal. An adversary’s log utility function is deﬁned as
�

G(t) = E max{k − a × log (||X t − X||2 + 1), 0} .
An adversary’s linear utility function is deﬁned as
�

L(t) = E max{k − a × ||X t − X||2 , 0} .
An adversary’s exponential utility function is deﬁned as
�

E(t) = E max{k − exp(a × ||X t − X||2 ), 0} .
In the adversarial multi-leader-follower Stackelberg game, all the players, the defender and the adversaries, choose their strategies to maximize their utilities. For
the defender, it is equivalent to minimize its overall misclassiﬁcation cost. For the
adversaries, it is to maximize the expected utilities of the unblocked attack objects.

4.2.4

Simulations

Notice the defender strategy is either to choose α or η(α) which controls its defensive wall, and an adversary’s strategy is an attack t, where 0 < α < 1 and 0 ≤ t ≤ 1.
By performing exhaustive search over ﬁne grids of α (or η(α)) and ti , we can ﬁnd the
approximate equilibrium in a game. Here we conduct experiments to examine the
equilibrium strategies of the defender and the adversaries under diﬀerent settings.
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Simulations With One Adversary There is only one adversary in the ﬁrst set
of experiments. Both normal and adversary populations follow bivariate
⎡
⎤normal dis1 0
⎦. Without
tributions. Let the normal population have µg = (0, 0) and Σg = ⎣
0 2
⎡
⎤
1
1
⎦.
an attack, let the adversary population original µb = (6, 6) and Σb = ⎣
1 2
Defender error cost c = 20 in Fig. 4.1,4.2,4.3,4.4,4.5,4.6. The blue ’+’s are the
normal objects, the green ’+’s are the original adversary objects, and the black ’+’s
are the moved adversary objects in an attack. Without an attack, the normal and the
adversary populations are well separated and the defender can easily build a defensive
line. The adversary has a log utility with a = 4 for Fig. 4.1 4.2; it has a linear utility
with a = 1.5 for Fig. 4.3 ,4.4; and an exponential utility with a = 0.75 for Fig. 4.5,4.6.
Fig. 4.1,4.2,4.3, 4.4,4.5,4.6 show when defender being the leader vs being the follower,
its Euclidean (red ellipsoid) and Manhattan (red diamond) defensive walls and the
corresponding attacks at the equilibrium.
Given the same normal population and the original adversary population, Table
4.1 shows the equilibrium αe (or η e ) and te with the equilibrium utilities for both
players given diﬀerent utility functions and diﬀerent penalties a and misclassiﬁcation
costs c.
We observe that when defender is the leader, it tends to choose a more conservative
strategy with a smaller defensive wall. In turn the adversaries launch stronger attacks
to break into the defensive walls. The strength of penalties on attacks signiﬁcantly
aﬀects the adversaries’ strategies, while the misclassiﬁcation cost is a key factor for
the defender to choose its strategy.
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Table 4.1. One Adversary Under Diﬀerent Utility Functions
a

c α e te

Ae

−Dle η e

L2D-Leader-Log

te

Ae

−Dle αe te

L1D-Leader-Log

Ae

−Dfe η e

L2D-Leader-Log

te

Ae

−Dfe

L1D-Leader-Log

3.25 1 0.91 0.66 0.452 0.60 2.80 0.58 0.141 0.24 0.80 0.63 0.159 0.29 2.89 0.47 0.087 0.10
3.25 2 0.71 0.74 0.268 1.04 2.32 0.63 0.087 0.39 0.82 0.58 0.099 0.27 2.58 0.50 0.058 0.15
3.25 10 0.03 0.95 0.056 2.04 1.23 0.77 0.023 0.97 0.01 0.98 0.048 8.05 2.47 0.42 0.021 0.19
4

1 0.95 0.52 0.123 0.18 3.14 0.42 0.046 0.07 0.94 0.47 0.083 0.11 3.63 0.26 0.058 0.03

4

2 0.90 0.56 0.080 0.30 3.14 0.42 0.046 0.12 0.93 0.44 0.056 0.13 3.63 0.18 0.040 0.03

4

10 0.53 0.70 0.018 0.74 2.37 0.50 0.016 0.30 0.90 0.38 0.021 0.17 3.33 0.10 0.015 0.05
L2D-Leader-Linear L1D-Leader-Linear L2D-Leader-Linear L1D-Leader-Linear

1

1 0.89 0.66 0.661 0.53 2.72 0.57 0.200 0.20 0.80 0.63 0.268 0.29 2.89 0.47 0.145 0.10

1

2 0.73 0.72 0.416 0.85 2.37 0.61 0.137 0.33 0.82 0.58 0.162 0.27 2.58 0.50 0.097 0.15

1

10 0.07 0.92 0.086 1.76 1.47 0.72 0.044 0.80 0.01 0.97 0.061 1.77 1.91 0.57 0.034 0.37

2

1 0.96 0.44 0.089 0.10 3.63 0.30 0.073 0.04 0.98 0.32 0.093 0.05 3.63 0.26 0.067 0.03

2

2 0.94 0.45 0.068 0.14 3.14 0.34 0.036 0.06 0.96 0.36 0.063 0.08 3.63 0.18 0.048 0.03

2

10 0.85 0.51 0.031 0.36 2.80 0.37 0.022 0.17 0.90 0.38 0.025 0.17 3.00 0.23 0.018 0.08
L2D-Leader-Exp

L1D-Leader-Exp

L2D-Leader-Exp

L1D-Leader-Exp

0.25 1 0.88 0.68 1.353 0.62 2.65 0.60 0.425 0.25 0.80 0.63 0.391 0.29 2.20 0.63 0.241 0.26
0.25 2 0.63 0.77 0.842 1.17 2.24 0.64 0.282 0.40 0.76 0.62 0.217 0.34 2.13 0.61 0.161 0.28
0.25 10 0.02 0.96 0.214 2.19 1.00 0.81 0.067 1.04 0.01 0.98 0.198 8.05 1.91 0.57 0.047 0.37
1

1 0.99 0.46 0.002 0.26 3.63 0.38 0.001 0.09 0.99 0.23 0.069 0.03 3.63 0.18 0.038 0.02

1

2 0.98 0.48 0.001 0.40 3.63 0.38 0.001 0.16 0.99 0.17 0.051 0.03 3.63 0.18 0.037 0.03

1

10 0.94 0.53 0.001 1.31 3.00 0.44 0.000 0.46 0.97 0.16 0.017 0.06 3.33 0.10 0.015 0.05
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Table 4.2. One Adversary, Defender as Leader with Linear Utility Function
Euclidean
a

c

αle

tel

Lel

Manhattan
−Dle ηle

tel

Lel

−Dle

0.5 1

0.98 0.67 3.551 0.97

3.63 0.63 2.417 0.87

0.5 2

0.98 0.67 3.551 1.93

2.65 0.72 1.848 1.70

0.5 5

0.98 0.67 3.551 4.79

0.41 0.95 0.689 3.47

0.5 10 0.98 0.67 3.551 9.56

0.41 0.95 0.689 6.00

0.5 20 0.95 0.71 3.358 19.07 0.41 0.95 0.689 11.06
0.5 50 0.08 0.95 2.219 47.11 0.41 0.95 0.689 26.25
1

1

0.89 0.66 0.661 0.53

2.72 0.57 0.200 0.20

1

2

0.73 0.72 0.416 0.85

2.37 0.61 0.137 0.33

1

5

0.07 0.92 0.086 1.34

2.00 0.65 0.088 0.56

1

10 0.07 0.92 0.086 1.76

1.47 0.72 0.044 0.80

1

20 0.01 0.97 0.061 2.55

0.90 0.81 0.020 1.07

1

50 0.01 0.97 0.061 4.90

0.16 0.96 0.006 1.29

1.5 1

0.95 0.52 0.215 0.18

3.14 0.42 0.080 0.07

1.5 2

0.88 0.57 0.123 0.29

3.14 0.42 0.080 0.12

1.5 5

0.79 0.61 0.077 0.49

2.72 0.46 0.045 0.20

1.5 10 0.62 0.67 0.041 0.71

2.37 0.50 0.027 0.30

1.5 20 0.46 0.72 0.024 0.95

2.03 0.54 0.016 0.43

1.5 50 0.09 0.87 0.006 1.19

1.51 0.62 0.007 0.67

2

1

0.96 0.44 0.089 0.10

3.63 0.30 0.073 0.04

2

2

0.94 0.45 0.068 0.14

3.14 0.34 0.036 0.06

2

5

0.89 0.49 0.042 0.25

2.89 0.36 0.025 0.11

2

10 0.85 0.51 0.031 0.36

2.80 0.37 0.022 0.17

2

20 0.73 0.56 0.016 0.50

2.52 0.40 0.014 0.25

2

50 0.53 0.63 0.007 0.74

2.03 0.46 0.006 0.38
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Table 4.3. One Adversary, Defender as Follower with Linear Utility Function
Euclidean
a

c

αle

tel

Lel

Manhattan
−Dle ηle

tel

Lel

−Dle

0.5 1

0.99 0.97 2.165 1.01

3.63 0.97 0.633 1.01

0.5 2

0.99 0.98 2.116 2.01

3.63 0.98 0.600 2.01

0.5 5

0.99 0.99 2.067 5.01

0.16 0.98 0.600 3.59

0.5 10 0.99 0.99 2.067 10.01 0.16 0.98 0.600 6.19
0.5 20 0.99 0.99 2.067 20.01 0.16 0.98 0.600 11.39
0.5 50 0.99 0.99 2.067 50.01 0.16 0.98 0.600 26.99
1

1

0.80 0.63 0.268 0.29

2.89 0.47 0.145 0.10

1

2

0.82 0.58 0.162 0.27

2.58 0.50 0.097 0.15

1

5

0.72 0.60 0.080 0.39

2.47 0.47 0.054 0.18

1

10 0.01 0.97 0.061 1.77

1.91 0.57 0.034 0.37

1

20 0.01 0.97 0.061 2.55

2.32 0.40 0.018 0.22

1

50 0.01 0.96 0.061 4.90

1.94 0.46 0.010 0.36

1.5 1

0.94 0.47 0.140 0.11

3.63 0.26 0.087 0.03

1.5 2

0.92 0.46 0.092 0.14

3.33 0.29 0.060 0.05

1.5 5

0.90 0.43 0.051 0.17

3.00 0.30 0.034 0.08

1.5 10 0.78 0.52 0.032 0.32

2.47 0.42 0.023 0.19

1.5 20 0.85 0.39 0.017 0.23

2.52 0.34 0.014 0.17

1.5 50 0.84 0.36 0.011 0.27

2.89 0.14 0.008 0.12

2

1

0.98 0.32 0.093 0.05

3.63 0.26 0.067 0.03

2

2

0.96 0.36 0.063 0.08

3.63 0.18 0.048 0.03

2

5

0.95 0.32 0.037 0.10

3.14 0.25 0.027 0.07

2

10 0.90 0.38 0.025 0.17

3.00 0.23 0.018 0.08

2

20 0.95 0.20 0.014 0.10

3.00 0.16 0.011 0.08

2

50 0.84 0.36 0.009 0.27

3.00 0.10 0.008 0.11
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Table 4.4. One Adversary, Defender as Leader with Log Utility Function
Euclidean
a

c

αle

tel

Gel

Manhattan
−Dle ηle

tel

Gel

−Dle

3.25 1

0.91 0.66 0.452 0.60 2.80 0.58 0.141 0.24

3.25 2

0.71 0.74 0.268 1.04 2.32 0.63 0.087 0.39

3.25 5

0.03 0.95 0.056 1.51 1.66 0.71 0.041 0.69

3.25 10 0.03 0.95 0.056 2.04 1.23 0.77 0.023 0.97
3.25 20 0.03 0.95 0.056 3.11 0.37 0.92 0.007 1.23
3.25 50 0.03 0.95 0.056 6.33 0.37 0.92 0.007 1.64
3.5

1

0.90 0.63 0.242 0.40 3.14 0.50 0.111 0.15

3.5

2

0.79 0.68 0.160 0.66 2.65 0.55 0.064 0.24

3.5

5

0.45 0.78 0.067 1.11 2.13 0.61 0.034 0.43

3.5

10 0.06 0.92 0.021 1.39 1.89 0.64 0.024 0.62

3.5

20 0.06 0.92 0.021 1.84 1.21 0.74 0.009 0.87

3.5

50 0.06 0.92 0.021 3.20 0.23 0.94 0.002 1.17

3.75 1

0.89 0.60 0.129 0.27 3.00 0.47 0.058 0.10

3.75 2

0.83 0.63 0.097 0.43 2.80 0.49 0.045 0.16

3.75 5

0.66 0.69 0.053 0.74 2.37 0.54 0.025 0.28

3.75 10 0.39 0.77 0.024 1.01 2.20 0.56 0.020 0.42
3.75 20 0.07 0.90 0.008 1.23 1.73 0.62 0.010 0.59
3.75 50 0.07 0.90 0.008 1.69 1.25 0.70 0.005 0.90
4

1

0.95 0.52 0.123 0.18 3.14 0.42 0.046 0.07

4

2

0.90 0.56 0.080 0.30 3.14 0.42 0.046 0.12

4

5

0.77 0.62 0.041 0.50 2.72 0.46 0.026 0.20

4

10 0.53 0.70 0.018 0.74 2.37 0.50 0.016 0.30

4

20 0.29 0.78 0.008 0.98 2.17 0.52 0.011 0.42

4

50 0.08 0.88 0.003 1.24 1.64 0.60 0.005 0.68
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Table 4.5. One Adversary, Defender as Follower with Log Utility Function
Euclidean
a

c

αle

tel

Gel

Manhattan
−Dle ηle

tel

Gel

−Dle

3.25 1

0.80 0.63 0.159 0.29

2.89 0.47 0.087 0.10

3.25 2

0.82 0.58 0.099 0.27

2.58 0.50 0.058 0.15

3.25 5

0.78 0.56 0.050 0.32

2.58 0.44 0.034 0.16

3.25 10 0.01 0.98 0.048 8.05

2.47 0.42 0.021 0.19

3.25 20 0.01 0.98 0.048 15.10 2.52 0.34 0.012 0.17
3.25 50 0.01 0.98 0.048 36.27 3.00 0.10 0.007 0.10
3.5

1

0.89 0.55 0.125 0.18

3.00 0.44 0.070 0.08

3.5

2

0.82 0.58 0.081 0.27

3.33 0.29 0.047 0.05

3.5

5

0.78 0.56 0.043 0.32

2.58 0.44 0.029 0.16

3.5

10 0.78 0.52 0.026 0.32

2.47 0.42 0.019 0.19

3.5

20 0.01 0.97 0.015 2.55

2.52 0.34 0.011 0.17

3.5

50 0.01 0.97 0.015 4.90

3.00 0.10 0.007 0.11

3.75 1

0.94 0.47 0.101 0.11

3.63 0.26 0.064 0.03

3.75 2

0.92 0.46 0.066 0.14

3.33 0.29 0.043 0.05

3.75 5

0.90 0.43 0.036 0.17

3.00 0.30 0.025 0.08

3.75 10 0.78 0.52 0.023 0.32

2.47 0.42 0.016 0.19

3.75 20 0.95 0.20 0.013 0.10

2.58 0.32 0.010 0.16

3.75 50 0.84 0.36 0.008 0.27

3.00 0.10 0.007 0.11

4

1

0.94 0.47 0.083 0.11

3.63 0.26 0.058 0.03

4

2

0.93 0.44 0.056 0.13

3.63 0.18 0.040 0.03

4

5

0.90 0.43 0.032 0.17

3.63 0.07 0.023 0.03

4

10 0.90 0.38 0.021 0.17

3.33 0.10 0.015 0.05

4

20 0.95 0.20 0.012 0.10

3.33 0.03 0.010 0.05

4

50 0.84 0.36 0.008 0.27

3.00 0.10 0.007 0.11
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Table 4.6. One Adversary with Exponential Utility Function
Euclidean
a

c

αle

tel

Ele

Manhattan
−Dle ηle

tel

Ele

−Dle

0.25 1

0.88 0.68 1.353 0.62 2.65

0.60 0.425 0.25

0.25 2

0.63 0.77 0.842 1.17 2.24

0.64 0.282 0.40

0.25 5

0.02 0.96 0.214 1.59 1.64

0.72 0.150 0.76

0.25 10 0.02 0.96 0.214 2.19 1.00

0.81 0.067 1.04

0.25 20 0.02 0.96 0.214 3.41 0.23

0.95 0.023 1.26

0.25 50 0.02 0.96 0.214 7.05 0.23

0.95 0.023 1.69

0.5

1

0.96 0.59 0.050 0.46 3.33

0.49 0.018 0.18

0.5

2

0.91 0.63 0.031 0.76 3.14

0.50 0.016 0.28

0.5

5

0.86 0.66 0.022 1.67 2.58

0.56 0.007 0.48

0.5

10 0.78 0.69 0.015 2.70 2.58

0.56 0.007 0.87

0.5

20 0.70 0.71 0.012 3.97 2.24

0.60 0.004 1.29

0.5

50 0.38 0.80 0.005 5.61 1.81

0.66 0.002 2.24

0.75 1

0.98 0.52 0.006 0.33 3.63

0.42 0.003 0.13

0.75 2

0.97 0.54 0.005 0.60 3.33

0.44 0.002 0.19

0.75 5

0.95 0.56 0.003 1.22 3.14

0.46 0.002 0.40

0.75 10 0.90 0.60 0.002 1.97 2.89

0.49 0.001 0.66

0.75 20 0.83 0.63 0.001 2.81 2.52

0.53 0.001 0.93

0.75 50 0.75 0.66 0.001 5.31 2.24

0.56 0.001 1.56

1

1

0.99 0.46 0.002 0.26 3.63

0.38 0.001 0.09

1

2

0.98 0.48 0.001 0.40 3.63

0.38 0.001 0.16

1

5

0.96 0.51 0.001 0.78 3.33

0.41 0.001 0.31

1

10 0.94 0.53 0.001 1.31 3.00

0.44 0.000 0.46

1

20 0.93 0.54 0.001 2.46 2.893 0.45 0.000 0.77

1

50 0.84 0.60 0.000 4.44 2.42

0.50 0.000 1.10
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Table 4.7. One Adversary, Defender as Follower with Exponential Utility Function
Euclidean
a

c

αle

tel

Ele

Manhattan
−Dle ηle

tel

Ele

−Dle

0.25 1

0.80 0.63 0.391 0.29 2.20 0.63 0.241 0.26

0.25 2

0.76 0.62 0.217 0.34 2.13 0.61 0.161 0.28

0.25 5

0.01 0.98 0.198 4.52 2.06 0.57 0.077 0.30

0.25 10 0.01 0.98 0.198 8.05 1.91 0.57 0.047 0.37
0.25 20 0.01 0.98 0.198 15.1 1.89 0.52 0.021 0.36
0.25 50 0.01 0.98 0.198 36.3 0.16 0.97 0.020 3.30
0.5

1

0.94 0.47 0.142 0.11 3.63 0.26 0.093 0.03

0.5

2

0.92 0.46 0.097 0.14 3.33 0.29 0.064 0.05

0.5

5

0.90 0.43 0.054 0.17 3.00 0.30 0.036 0.08

0.5

10 0.78 0.52 0.034 0.32 2.47 0.42 0.024 0.19

0.5

20 0.85 0.39 0.018 0.23 2.52 0.34 0.015 0.17

0.5

50 0.84 0.36 0.011 0.27 1.94 0.46 0.008 0.36

0.75 1

0.99 0.23 0.087 0.03 3.63 0.25 0.058 0.03

0.75 2

0.98 0.26 0.060 0.05 3.63 0.18 0.047 0.03

0.75 5

0.95 0.32 0.036 0.10 3.14 0.25 0.026 0.07

0.75 10 0.91 0.36 0.023 0.16 3.00 0.23 0.017 0.08
0.75 20 0.94 0.23 0.014 0.12 2.89 0.20 0.011 0.10
0.75 50 0.84 0.36 0.009 0.27 2.89 0.14 0.007 0.12
1

1

0.99 0.23 0.069 0.03 3.63 0.18 0.038 0.02

1

2

0.99 0.17 0.051 0.03 3.63 0.18 0.037 0.03

1

5

0.97 0.23 0.028 0.06 3.63 0.07 0.022 0.03

1

10 0.97 0.16 0.017 0.06 3.33 0.10 0.015 0.05

1

20 0.95 0.20 0.012 0.10 3.00 0.16 0.010 0.08

1

50 0.86 0.30 0.006 0.22 3.00 0.10 0.007 0.11
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Simulations With Three Adversaries There are three adversaries in the second
set of experiments. Normal and adversary populations follow bivariate normal disg
tributions for
⎡ Fig.⎤4.7,4.8,4.10,4.10,4.11,4.12. The normal population has µ = (0, 0)
1 0
⎦. Without an attack, the ﬁrst adversary population originally
and Σg = ⎣
0 2
⎡
⎤
1 1
⎦. The second adversary population originally has
has µb1 = (6, 6) and Σb1 = ⎣
1 2
⎡
⎤
1
−0.5
⎦. The third adversary population originally
µb2 = (−7, −7) and Σb2 = ⎣
−0.5
1
⎡
⎤
1 0
⎦. We let k = 7 and c = 10. For Fig. 4.7,4.8,
has µb3 = (−6, 6) and Σb3 = ⎣
0 2
we have (a1 , a2 , a3 ) = (1.75, 1.25, .1.25) for three adversary log utility functions. For

Fig. 4.9,4.10, we have (a1 , a2 , a3 ) = (0.5, 0.25, 0.5) for three adversary linear utility
functions. For Fig. 4.11,4.12, we have (a1 , a2 , a3 ) = (4.5, 4, 4.5) for three adversary
exponential utility functions.
Normal and adversary populations follow 5-dim multivariate normal distributions
for Table 4.8. The normal population has µg = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0) and Σg = diag{4, 9, 4, 9, 4}.
b
Without an attack, the⎡ﬁrst adversary population
⎤ originally has µ1 = (3.5, 3.5, 3.5, 3.5, 3.5)

1 0.8 0.6
⎢
⎢
⎢0.8 1 0.8
⎢
⎢
with correlation ρb1 = ⎢0.6 0.8 1
⎢
⎢
⎢0.4 0.6 0.8
⎣
0.2 0.4 0.6
ond adversary
population originally
⎡

0.4 0.2

⎥
⎥
0.6 0.4⎥
⎥
⎥
0.8 0.6⎥, and variances (1, 2, 3, 4, 5). The sec⎥
⎥
1 0.8⎥
⎦
0.8 1
b
has
⎤ µ2 = (−4, −3, −4, −3, −4) with correlation

1
−0.5
0
0
0
⎢
⎥
⎢
⎥
⎢−0.5
1
−0.5
0
0 ⎥
⎢
⎥
⎢
⎥
ρb2 = ⎢ 0
−0.5
1
−0.5
0 ⎥, and variances (3, 4, 3, 4, 3). The third ad⎢
⎥
⎢
⎥
⎢ 0
0
−0.5
1
−0.5⎥
⎣
⎦
0
0
0
−0.5
1
versary population originally has µb3 = (−3, 4, 4, −5, −5) and Σb3 = diag{3, 3, 3, 3, 3}.
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We also did several simulation with other parameter setting for defender as leader
(Table 4.11 4.12 4.13 4.14) and defender as follower (Table 4.17 4.18 4.19 4.20)
We observe that Euclidean defensive walls used by the defender tends to encourage
attacks with similar strength. Given the initial position of diﬀerent adversaries and
their penalties, Manhattan defensive walls used by the defender can discourage an
adversary from launching an attack.
Remark: When defender is the follower, it is able to observe the action of the attackers and hence draw a less conservative defensive wall. In our GDClust algorithm,
we choose to take the follower approach. We recommend α in the range from 0.7 to
0.9 following the game theoretic simulations. Hence we identify the core positions of
normal without blocking out too many normal objects or unintentionally force the
adversaries to launch strong attacks.

4.3

Experiments

4.3.1

Simulated Experiment

We conduct a simulation to show the performance of the adversarial clustering
algorithm. We generate three sets of random samples from three bivariate normal
distribution centered at (1, 1), (0.5, -1), and(1, -1); each of the sets contains 250 data
points. We assume that the distributions centered at (1, 1) and (0.5, -1) are normal
and the one centered at (1, -1) is abnormal. In GDClust, only three points have
labels: (.99, 1.01) and (0.51, -1) are labeled as normal and (1.01, -1.1) is labeled as
abnormal.
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Table 4.8. Three Adversaries
(a1 , a2 , a3 )

c αe (te1 , te2 , t3e )

(Ae1 , Ae2 , Ae3 )

Euclidean-Leader-Log

−De η e

(te1 , te2 , t3e )

(Ae1 , Ae2 , Ae3 )

−De

Manhattan-Leader-Log

(4.0,4.0,4.0)

1 0.98 (0.40,0.50,0.49) (0.904,0.167,0.123) 2.33 4.62 (0.70,0,0.72)

(0.105,0.000,0.001) 2.65

(4.5,4.0,4.0)

1 0.99 (0.29,0.48,0.46) (0.876,0.263,0.172) 2.20 4.62 (0.64,0,0.72)

(0.063,0.000,0.001) 2.46

(4.0,4.5,4.5)

1 0.97 (0.43,0.46,0.44) (0.829,0.019,0.037) 1.88 6.09 (0.58,0,0.55)

(0.171,0.000,0.001) 1.58

(4.5,4.5,4.5)

1 0.97 (0.35,0.46,0.44) (0.664,0.019,0.037) 1.73 6.09 (0.52,0,0.55)

(0.116,0.000,0.001) 1.44

Euclidean-Follower-Log

Manhattan-Follower-Log

(4.0,4.0,4.0)

1 0.96 (0.44,0.60,0.76) (0.775,0.022,0.003) 2.76 6.76 (0.58,0,0.68)

(0.201,0.000,0.003) 1.97

(4.5,4.0,4.0)

1 0.97 (0.25,0.60,0.73) (0.616,0.022,0.005) 2.45 6.55 (0.53,0,0.69)

(0.130,0.000,0.002) 1.85

(4.0,4.5,4.5)

1 0.97 (0.50,0.66,0.05) (0.778,0.000,0.002) 1.89 6.76 (0.58,0,0.68)

(0.201,0.000,0.000) 1.97

(4.5,4.5,4.5)

1 0.97 (0.27,0,0.01)

(0.130,0.000,0.000) 1.85

(0.628,0.000,0.002) 0.49 6.55 (0.53,0,0.69)

Euclidean-Leader-Linear

Manhattan-Leader-Linear

(1.25,1.25,1.25) 1 0.99 (0.46,0.51,0.51) (1.917,0.984,0.572) 2.71 7.53 (0.56,0.60,0.59) (0.570,0.012,0.059) 2.93
(1.75,1.25,1.25) 1 0.99 (0.37,0.51,0.51) (1.360,0.984,0.572) 2.55 7.53 (0.46,0.60,0.59) (0.336,0.012,0.059) 2.75
(1.25,1.75,1.75) 1 0.98 (0.49,0.46,0.45) (1.737,0.105,0.115) 2.22 5.78 (0.66,0,0.60)

(0.372,0.000,0.003) 1.94

(1.75,1.75,1.75) 1 0.96 (0.43,0.49,0.48) (1.013,0.044,0.072) 2.03 5.78 (0.58,0,0.60)

(0.188,0.000,0.003) 1.74

Euclidean-Follower-Linear

Manhattan-Follower-Linear

(1.25,1.25,1.25) 1 0.98 (0.55,0.61,0.80) (1.622,0.359,0.019) 2.97 7.53 (0.60,0.85,0.66) (0.537,0.000,0.027) 3.00
(1.75,1.25,1.25) 1 0.96 (0.44,0.60,0.76) (1.011,0.420,0.031) 2.76 6.55 (0.53,0.77,0.69) (0.246,0.000,0.018) 2.85
(1.25,1.75,1.75) 1 0.98 (0.54,0,0.66)

(1.660,0.000,0.004) 1.96 7.53 (0.60,0.85,0.66) (0.537,0.000,0.001) 3.00

(1.75,1.75,1.75) 1 0.96 (0.43,0,0.66)

(1.013,0.000,0.004) 1.74 6.55 (0.53,0,0.69)

Euclidean-Leader-Exponential

(0.246,0.000,0.001) 1.85

Manhattan-Leader-Exponential

(0.25,0.25,0.25) 1 0.99 (0.58,0.57,0.59) (3.269,3.091,2.185) 2.99 7.53 (0.67,0.68,0.68) (1.359,0.402,0.431) 3.03
(0.50,0.25,0.25) 1 0.99 (0.40,0.57,0.59) (1.664,3.091,2.185) 2.74 7.53 (0.48,0.68,0.68) (0.431,0.402,0.431) 2.79
(0.25,0.50,0.50) 1 0.97 (0.62,0.47,0.46) (3.003,0.090,0.125) 2.31 5.98 (0.74,0.01,0.59) (1.050,0.000,0.005) 1.93
(0.50,0.50,0.50) 1 0.97 (0.44,0.47,0.46) (1.353,0.090,0.125) 2.02 5.98 (0.58,0.01,0.59) (0.265,0.000,0.005) 1.67
Euclidean-Follower-Exponential

Manhattan-Follower-Exponential

(0.25,0.25,0.25) 1 0.99 (0.75,0.67,0.59) (2.284,2.380,2.185) 3.02 7.53 (0.67,0.68,0.85) (1.359,0.402,0.091) 3.03
(0.50,0.25,0.25) 1 0.99 (0.79,0.65,0.59) (0.277,2.584,2.185) 3.02 7.53 (0.79,0.68,0.68) (0.097,0.402,0.431) 3.03
(0.25,0.50,0.50) 1 0.99 (0.58,0.63,0.10) (3.269,0.000,0.009) 2.02 7.53 (0.67,0.01,0.64) (1.359,0.000,0.003) 2.02
(0.50,0.50,0.50) 1 0.96 (0.45,0,0.67)

(1.269,0.000,0.005) 1.79 6.55 (0.54,0.01,0.70) (0.320,0.000,0.001) 1.85
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Table 4.9. Defender as Leader vs Three Adversaries with Linear Utility Functions in Manhattan distance
Euclidean
(a1 , a2 , a3 )

c

αe

(te1 , te2 , te3 )

(L1e , L2e , Le3 )

−De

(1.25,1.25,1.25) 1

0.99 (0.46,0.51,0.51) (1.917,0.984,0.572) 2.71

(1.25,1.25,1.25) 5

0.97 (0.51,0.56,0.55) (1.628,0.608,0.368) 13.38

(1.25,1.25,1.25) 10 0.96 (0.53,0.57,0.56) (1.550,0.515,0.320) 26.65
(1.75,1.25,1.25) 1

0.99 (0.37,0.51,0.51) (1.360,0.984,0.572) 2.55

(1.75,1.25,1.25) 5

0.96 (0.43,0.57,0.56) (1.013,0.515,0.320) 12.39

(1.75,1.25,1.25) 10 0.96 (0.43,0.57,0.56) (1.013,0.515,0.320) 24.65
(1.25,1.75,1.25) 1

0.98 (0.49,0.46,0.54) (1.737,0.105,0.439) 2.59

(1.25,1.75,1.25) 5

0.39 (0.77,0,0.78)

(0.655,0.000,0.022) 11.25

(1.25,1.75,1.25) 10 0.39 (0.77,0,0.78)

(0.655,0.000,0.022) 20.67

(1.75,1.75,1.25) 1

0.96 (0.43,0.49,0.56) (1.013,0.044,0.320) 2.40

(1.75,1.75,1.25) 5

0.40 (0.70,0,0.78)

(0.297,0.000,0.023) 10.11

(1.75,1.75,1.25) 10 0.40 (0.70,0,0.78)

(0.297,0.000,0.023) 18.42

(1.25,1.25,1.75) 1

0.98 (0.49,0.54,0.45) (1.737,0.746,0.115) 2.37

(1.25,1.25,1.75) 5

0.88 (0.60,0.63,0.53) (1.232,0.204,0.026) 11.40

(1.25,1.25,1.75) 10 0.88 (0.60,0.63,0.53) (1.232,0.204,0.026) 22.45
(1.75,1.25,1.75) 1

0.98 (0.39,0.54,0.45) (1.187,0.746,0.115) 2.18

(1.75,1.25,1.75) 5

0.88 (0.50,0.63,0.53) (0.730,0.204,0.026) 10.25

(1.75,1.25,1.75) 10 0.88 (0.50,0.63,0.53) (0.730,0.204,0.026) 20.15
(1.25,1.75,1.75) 1

0.98 (0.49,0.46,0.45) (1.737,0.105,0.115) 2.22

(1.25,1.75,1.75) 5

0.41 (0.77,0,0.70)

(1.25,1.75,1.75) 10 0.41 (0.77,0,0.70)

(0.672,0.000,0.002) 8.59
(0.672,0.000,0.002) 15.41

(1.75,1.75,1.75) 1

0.96 (0.43,0.49,0.48) (1.013,0.044,0.072) 2.03

(1.75,1.75,1.75) 5

0.41 (0.70,0,0.70)

(1.75,1.75,1.75) 10 0.41 (0.70,0,0.70)

(0.303,0.000,0.002) 7.45
(0.303,0.000,0.002) 13.13
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Table 4.10. Defender as Leader vs Three Adversaries with Linear
Utility Functions in Manhattan Distance
Manhattan
(a1 , a2 , a3 )

c

ηe

(te1 , te2 , te3 )

(L1e , L2e , Le3 )

−De

(1.25,1.25,1.25) 1

7.53 (0.56,0.60,0.59) (0.570,0.012,0.059) 2.93

(1.25,1.25,1.25) 5

3.20 (0.85,0,0.85)

(0.178,0.000,0.003) 12.05

(1.25,1.25,1.25) 10 3.20 (0.85,0,0.85)

(0.178,0.000,0.003) 22.01

(1.75,1.25,1.25) 1

7.53 (0.46,0.60,0.59) (0.336,0.012,0.059) 2.75

(1.75,1.25,1.25) 5

3.13 (0.80,0,0.86)

(0.065,0.000,0.003) 11.41

(1.75,1.25,1.25) 10 3.13 (0.80,0,0.86)

(0.065,0.000,0.003) 20.67

(1.25,1.75,1.25) 1

5.78 (0.66,0,0.68)

(0.372,0.000,0.020) 2.19

(1.25,1.75,1.25) 5

5.78 (0.66,0,0.68)

(0.372,0.000,0.020) 9.76

(1.25,1.75,1.25) 10 5.78 (0.66,0,0.68)

(0.372,0.000,0.020) 19.22

(1.75,1.75,1.25) 1

5.78 (0.58,0,0.68)

(0.188,0.000,0.020) 2.00

(1.75,1.75,1.25) 5

5.69 (0.58,0,0.68)

(0.182,0.000,0.018) 8.69

(1.75,1.75,1.25) 10 5.46 (0.59,0,0.70)

(0.168,0.000,0.016) 17.04

(1.25,1.25,1.75) 1

7.53 (0.56,0.60,0.50) (0.570,0.012,0.013) 2.75

(1.25,1.25,1.75) 5

3.16 (0.85,0,0.80)

(0.177,0.000,0.000) 11.43

(1.25,1.25,1.75) 10 3.16 (0.85,0,0.80)

(0.177,0.000,0.000) 20.74

(1.75,1.25,1.75) 1

7.53 (0.46,0.60,0.50) (0.336,0.012,0.013) 2.56

(1.75,1.25,1.75) 5

3.16 (0.80,0,0.80)

(0.066,0.000,0.000) 10.79

(1.75,1.25,1.75) 10 3.16 (0.80,0,0.80)

(0.066,0.000,0.000) 19.44

(1.25,1.75,1.75) 1

5.78 (0.66,0,0.60)

(0.372,0.000,0.003) 1.94

(1.25,1.75,1.75) 5

5.15 (0.70,0,0.63)

(0.314,0.000,0.002) 8.44

(1.25,1.75,1.75) 10 5.15 (0.70,0,0.63)

(0.314,0.000,0.002) 16.31

(1.75,1.75,1.75) 1

5.78 (0.58,0,0.60)

(0.188,0.000,0.003) 1.74

(1.75,1.75,1.75) 5

5.54 (0.59,0,0.61)

(0.172,0.000,0.002) 7.33

(1.75,1.75,1.75) 10 5.15 (0.62,0,0.63)

(0.149,0.000,0.002) 14.13
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Table 4.11. Defender as Leader vs Three Adversaries with Log Utility
Functions in Eucliean Distance
Euclidean
(a1 , a2 , a3 )

c

αe

(te1 , te2 , te3 )

(Ge1 , Ge2 , Ge3 )

−De

(4.0,4.0,4.0) 1

0.98 (0.40,0.50,0.49) (0.904,0.167,0.123) 2.33

(4.0,4.0,4.0) 5

0.96 (0.44,0.53,0.52) (0.775,0.092,0.082) 11.34

(4.0,4.0,4.0) 10 0.14 (0.84,0,0.85)

(0.169,0.000,0.001) 21.95

(4.5,4.0,4.0) 1

0.99 (0.29,0.48,0.46) (0.876,0.263,0.172) 2.20

(4.5,4.0,4.0) 5

0.96 (0.37,0.53,0.52) (0.612,0.092,0.082) 10.68

(4.5,4.0,4.0) 10 0.14 (0.81,0,0.85)

(0.087,0.000,0.001) 20.79

(4.0,4.5,4.0) 1

0.98 (0.40,0.44,0.49) (0.904,0.034,0.123) 2.15

(4.0,4.5,4.0) 5

0.47 (0.71,0,0.72)

(4.0,4.5,4.0) 10 0.47 (0.71,0,0.72)

(0.286,0.000,0.004) 9.14
(0.286,0.000,0.004) 16.68

(4.5,4.5,4.0) 1

0.96 (0.37,0.47,0.52) (0.612,0.012,0.082) 2.03

(4.5,4.5,4.0) 5

0.46 (0.66,0,0.72)

(4.5,4.5,4.0) 10 0.46 (0.66,0,0.72)

(0.171,0.000,0.004) 8.19
(0.171,0.000,0.004) 14.76

(4.0,4.0,4.5) 1

0.97 (0.43,0.52,0.44) (0.829,0.121,0.037) 2.07

(4.0,4.0,4.5) 5

0.88 (0.53,0.59,0.51) (0.573,0.021,0.010) 9.85

(4.0,4.0,4.5) 10 0.14 (0.84,0,0.80)

(0.169,0.000,0.000) 18.15

(4.5,4.0,4.5) 1

0.97 (0.35,0.52,0.44) (0.664,0.121,0.037) 1.92

(4.5,4.0,4.5) 5

0.88 (0.47,0.59,0.51) (0.419,0.021,0.010) 9.19

(4.5,4.0,4.5) 10 0.14 (0.81,0,0.80)

(0.087,0.000,0.000) 16.98

(4.0,4.5,4.5) 1

0.97 (0.43,0.46,0.44) (0.829,0.019,0.037) 1.88

(4.0,4.5,4.5) 5

0.44 (0.72,0,0.66)

(4.0,4.5,4.5) 10 0.44 (0.72,0,0.66)

(0.274,0.000,0.001) 6.87
(0.274,0.000,0.001) 12.07

(4.5,4.5,4.5) 1

0.97 (0.35,0.46,0.44) (0.664,0.019,0.037) 1.73

(4.5,4.5,4.5) 5

0.44 (0.67,0,0.66)

(4.5,4.5,4.5) 10 0.44 (0.67,0,0.66)

(0.165,0.000,0.001) 6.01
(0.165,0.000,0.001) 10.35
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Table 4.12. Defender as Leader vs Three Adversaries with Log Utility
Functions in Manhattan Distance
Manhattan
(a1 , a2 , a3 )

c

ηe

(te1 , te2 , te3 )

(Ge1 , Ge2 , Ge3 )

−De

(4.0,4.0,4.0) 1

4.62 (0.70,0,0.72) (0.105,0.000,0.001) 2.65

(4.0,4.0,4.0) 5

4.58 (0.70,0,0.72) (0.103,0.000,0.001) 9.61

(4.0,4.0,4.0) 10 4.58 (0.70,0,0.72) (0.103,0.000,0.001) 18.30
(4.5,4.0,4.0) 1

4.62 (0.64,0,0.72) (0.063,0.000,0.001) 2.46

(4.5,4.0,4.0) 5

4.58 (0.64,0,0.72) (0.062,0.000,0.001) 8.63

(4.5,4.0,4.0) 10 4.58 (0.64,0,0.72) (0.062,0.000,0.001) 16.33
(4.0,4.5,4.0) 1

6.22 (0.57,0,0.61) (0.178,0.000,0.006) 1.84

(4.0,4.5,4.0) 5

6.22 (0.57,0,0.61) (0.178,0.000,0.006) 8.46

(4.0,4.5,4.0) 10 6.22 (0.57,0,0.61) (0.178,0.000,0.006) 16.75
(4.5,4.5,4.0) 1

6.22 (0.51,0,0.61) (0.122,0.000,0.006) 1.69

(4.5,4.5,4.0) 5

6.22 (0.51,0,0.61) (0.122,0.000,0.006) 7.74

(4.5,4.5,4.0) 10 5.04 (0.59,0,0.68) (0.075,0.000,0.002) 15.20
(4.0,4.0,4.5) 1

4.62 (0.70,0,0.65) (0.105,0.000,0.000) 2.28

(4.0,4.0,4.5) 5

4.50 (0.71,0,0.65) (0.100,0.000,0.000) 7.67

(4.0,4.0,4.5) 10 1.58 (0.95,0,0)

(0.036,0.000,0.000) 12.94

(4.5,4.0,4.5) 1

4.62 (0.64,0,0.65) (0.063,0.000,0.000) 2.09

(4.5,4.0,4.5) 5

4.50 (0.65,0,0.65) (0.060,0.000,0.000) 6.67

(4.5,4.0,4.5) 10 4.50 (0.65,0,0.65) (0.060,0.000,0.000) 12.36
(4.0,4.5,4.5) 1

6.09 (0.58,0,0.55) (0.171,0.000,0.001) 1.58

(4.0,4.5,4.5) 5

6.09 (0.58,0,0.55) (0.171,0.000,0.001) 7.08

(4.0,4.5,4.5) 10 1.58 (0.95,0,0)

(0.036,0.000,0.000) 12.94

(4.5,4.5,4.5) 1

6.09 (0.52,0,0.55) (0.116,0.000,0.001) 1.44

(4.5,4.5,4.5) 5

6.09 (0.52,0,0.55) (0.116,0.000,0.001) 6.34

(4.5,4.5,4.5) 10 4.85 (0.61,0,0.63) (0.069,0.000,0.000) 12.07
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Table 4.13. Defender as Leader vs Three Adversaries with Exponential Utility Functions in Euclidean Distance
Euclidean
(a1 , a2 , a3 )

c

αe

(te1 , te2 , te3 )

(E1e , E2e , E3e )

−De

(0.25,0.25,0.25) 1

0.99 (0.58,0.57,0.59) (3.269,3.091,2.185) 2.99

(0.25,0.25,0.25) 5

0.99 (0.58,0.57,0.59) (3.269,3.091,2.185) 14.85

(0.25,0.25,0.25) 10 0.99 (0.58,0.57,0.59) (3.269,3.091,2.185) 29.67
(0.50,0.25,0.25) 1

0.99 (0.40,0.57,0.59) (1.664,3.091,2.185) 2.74

(0.50,0.25,0.25) 5

0.95 (0.46,0.65,0.65) (1.204,2.446,1.570) 13.41

(0.50,0.25,0.25) 10 0.95 (0.46,0.65,0.65) (1.204,2.446,1.570) 26.67
(0.25,0.50,0.25) 1

0.97 (0.62,0.47,0.63) (3.003,0.090,1.778) 2.85

(0.25,0.50,0.25) 5

0.43 (0.82,0,0.82)

(1.871,0.000,0.431) 11.69

(0.25,0.50,0.25) 10 0.43 (0.82,0,0.82)

(1.871,0.000,0.431) 21.68

(0.50,0.50,0.25) 1

0.97 (0.44,0.47,0.63) (1.353,0.090,1.778) 2.55

(0.50,0.50,0.25) 5

0.43 (0.69,0,0.82)

(0.414,0.000,0.431) 10.15

(0.50,0.50,0.25) 10 0.43 (0.69,0,0.82)

(0.414,0.000,0.431) 18.60

(0.25,0.25,0.50) 1

0.97 (0.62,0.62,0.46) (3.003,2.678,0.125) 2.52

(0.25,0.25,0.50) 5

0.89 (0.68,0.69,0.52) (2.621,2.030,0.041) 12.03

(0.25,0.25,0.50) 10 0.89 (0.68,0.69,0.52) (2.621,2.030,0.041) 23.72
(0.50,0.25,0.50) 1

0.97 (0.44,0.62,0.46) (1.353,2.678,0.125) 2.23

(0.50,0.25,0.50) 5

0.89 (0.51,0.69,0.52) (0.965,2.030,0.041) 10.40

(0.50,0.25,0.50) 10 0.89 (0.51,0.69,0.52) (0.965,2.030,0.041) 20.47
(0.25,0.50,0.50) 1

0.97 (0.62,0.47,0.46) (3.003,0.090,0.125) 2.31

(0.25,0.50,0.50) 5

0.42 (0.82,0,0.69)

(0.25,0.50,0.50) 10 0.42 (0.82,0,0.69)

(1.856,0.000,0.003) 8.62
(1.856,0.000,0.003) 15.49

(0.50,0.50,0.50) 1

0.97 (0.44,0.47,0.46) (1.353,0.090,0.125) 2.02

(0.50,0.50,0.50) 5

0.42 (0.70,0,0.69)

(0.50,0.50,0.50) 10 0.42 (0.70,0,0.69)

(0.408,0.000,0.003) 7.21
(0.408,0.000,0.003) 12.68
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Table 4.14. Defender as Leader vs Three Adversaries with Exponential Utility Functions in Manhattan Distance
Manhattan
(a1 , a2 , a3 )

c

ηe

(te1 , te2 , te3 )

(E1e , E2e , E3e )

−De

(0.25,0.25,0.25) 1

7.53 (0.67,0.68,0.68) (1.359,0.402,0.431) 3.03

(0.25,0.25,0.25) 5

7.53 (0.67,0.68,0.68) (1.359,0.402,0.431) 15.01

(0.25,0.25,0.25) 10 7.53 (0.67,0.68,0.68) (1.359,0.402,0.431) 29.99
(0.50,0.25,0.25) 1

7.53 (0.48,0.68,0.68) (0.431,0.402,0.431) 2.79

(0.50,0.25,0.25) 5

6.37 (0.55,0.73,0.73) (0.303,0.179,0.271) 13.78

(0.50,0.25,0.25) 10 6.37 (0.55,0.73,0.73) (0.303,0.179,0.271) 27.41
(0.25,0.50,0.25) 1

5.98 (0.74,0.01,0.75) (1.050,0.000,0.228) 2.24

(0.25,0.50,0.25) 5

5.98 (0.74,0.01,0.75) (1.050,0.000,0.228) 10.22

(0.25,0.50,0.25) 10 5.98 (0.74,0.01,0.75) (1.050,0.000,0.228) 20.20
(0.50,0.50,0.25) 1

5.98 (0.58,0.01,0.75) (0.265,0.000,0.228) 1.97

(0.50,0.50,0.25) 5

5.98 (0.58,0.01,0.75) (0.265,0.000,0.228) 8.89

(0.50,0.50,0.25) 10 5.39 (0.61,0.01,0.78) (0.215,0.000,0.175) 17.43
(0.25,0.25,0.50) 1

7.06 (0.69,0.70,0.53) (1.261,0.297,0.012) 2.81

(0.25,0.25,0.50) 5

6.22 (0.73,0.74,0.57) (1.098,0.162,0.006) 13.58

(0.25,0.25,0.50) 10 5.27 (0.78,0.79,0.63) (0.926,0.069,0.002) 26.92
(0.50,0.25,0.50) 1

7.06 (0.51,0.70,0.53) (0.374,0.297,0.012) 2.57

(0.50,0.25,0.50) 5

6.22 (0.56,0.74,0.57) (0.288,0.162,0.006) 12.22

(0.50,0.25,0.50) 10 5.27 (0.62,0.79,0.63) (0.205,0.069,0.002) 23.93
(0.25,0.50,0.50) 1

5.98 (0.74,0.01,0.59) (1.050,0.000,0.005) 1.93

(0.25,0.50,0.50) 5

5.61 (0.76,0.01,0.61) (0.985,0.000,0.003) 8.67

(0.25,0.50,0.50) 10 5.27 (0.78,0.01,0.63) (0.926,0.000,0.002) 16.92
(0.50,0.50,0.50) 1

5.98 (0.58,0.01,0.59) (0.265,0.000,0.005) 1.67

(0.50,0.50,0.50) 5

5.27 (0.62,0.01,0.63) (0.205,0.000,0.002) 7.22

(0.50,0.50,0.50) 10 5.27 (0.62,0.01,0.63) (0.205,0.000,0.002) 13.93
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Table 4.15. Defender as Follower vs Three Adversaries with Linear
Utility Functions in Euclidean Distance
Euclidean
(a1 , a2 , a3 )

c

αe

(te1 , te2 , te3 )

(L1e , L2e , Le3 )

−De

(1.25,1.25,1.25) 1

0.98 (0.55,0.61,0.80) (1.622,0.359,0.019) 2.97

(1.25,1.25,1.25) 5

0.99 (0.85,0.93,0.04) (0.510,0.000,0.007) 10.08

(1.25,1.25,1.25) 10 0.97 (0.89,0.91,0.15) (0.441,0.000,0.005) 20.21
(1.75,1.25,1.25) 1

0.96 (0.44,0.60,0.76) (1.011,0.420,0.031) 2.76

(1.75,1.25,1.25) 5

0.82 (0.27,0.90,0.90) (0.276,0.000,0.006) 11.53

(1.75,1.25,1.25) 10 0.97 (0.89,0.91,0.15) (0.136,0.000,0.005) 20.21
(1.25,1.75,1.25) 1

0.98 (0.54,0,0.66)

(1.660,0.000,0.116) 1.96

(1.25,1.75,1.25) 5

0.99 (0.85,0,0.04)

(0.510,0.000,0.007) 5.08

(1.25,1.75,1.25) 10 0.97 (0.89,0.01,0.15) (0.441,0.000,0.005) 10.21
(1.75,1.75,1.25) 1

0.96 (0.44,0,0.65)

(1.011,0.000,0.132) 1.76

(1.75,1.75,1.25) 5

0.82 (0.27,0,0.90)

(0.276,0.000,0.006) 6.53

(1.75,1.75,1.25) 10 0.97 (0.89,0.01,0.15) (0.136,0.000,0.005) 10.21
(1.25,1.25,1.75) 1

0.98 (0.55,0.61,0.09) (1.622,0.359,0.005) 1.98

(1.25,1.25,1.75) 5

0.99 (0.85,0.93,0.04) (0.510,0.000,0.006) 10.08

(1.25,1.25,1.75) 10 0.97 (0.89,0.91,0.15) (0.441,0.000,0.005) 20.21
(1.75,1.25,1.75) 1

0.96 (0.44,0.60,0.76) (1.011,0.420,0.001) 2.76

(1.75,1.25,1.75) 5

0.82 (0.27,0.89,0.91) (0.276,0.000,0.000) 11.53

(1.75,1.25,1.75) 10 0.97 (0.89,0.91,0.15) (0.136,0.000,0.005) 20.21
(1.25,1.75,1.75) 1

0.98 (0.54,0,0.66)

(1.660,0.000,0.004) 1.96

(1.25,1.75,1.75) 5

0.99 (0.85,0,0.04)

(0.510,0.000,0.006) 5.08

(1.25,1.75,1.75) 10 0.97 (0.89,0.01,0.15) (0.441,0.000,0.005) 10.21
(1.75,1.75,1.75) 1

0.96 (0.43,0,0.66)

(1.013,0.000,0.004) 1.74

(1.75,1.75,1.75) 5

0.82 (0.27,0,0.90)

(0.276,0.000,0.000) 6.53

(1.75,1.75,1.75) 10 0.97 (0.89,0.01,0.15) (0.136,0.000,0.005) 10.21
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Table 4.16. Defender as Follower vs Three Adversaries with Linear
Utility Functions in Manhattan Distance
Manhattan
(a1 , a2 , a3 )

c

ηe

(te1 , te2 , te3 )

(L1e , L2e , Le3 )

−De

(1.25,1.25,1.25) 1

7.53 (0.60,0.85,0.66) (0.537,0.000,0.027) 3.00

(1.25,1.25,1.25) 5

7.53 (0.88,0,0.92)

(0.158,0.000,0.001) 10.03

(1.25,1.25,1.25) 10 7.53 (0.91,0,0.92)

(0.141,0.000,0.001) 20.04

(1.75,1.25,1.25) 1

6.55 (0.53,0.77,0.69) (0.246,0.000,0.018) 2.85

(1.75,1.25,1.25) 5

5.15 (0.36,0.22,0.91) (0.055,0.000,0.001) 6.58

(1.75,1.25,1.25) 10 7.53 (0.91,0,0.92)

(0.042,0.000,0.001) 20.04

(1.25,1.75,1.25) 1

7.53 (0.60,0.85,0.66) (0.537,0.000,0.027) 3.00

(1.25,1.75,1.25) 5

7.53 (0.88,0,0.92)

(0.158,0.000,0.001) 10.03

(1.25,1.75,1.25) 10 7.53 (0.91,0,0.92)

(0.141,0.000,0.001) 20.04

(1.75,1.75,1.25) 1

6.55 (0.53,0,0.69)

(0.246,0.000,0.018) 1.85

(1.75,1.75,1.25) 5

5.15 (0.36,0.22,0.91) (0.055,0.000,0.001) 6.58

(1.75,1.75,1.25) 10 7.53 (0.91,0,0.92)

(0.042,0.000,0.001) 20.04

(1.25,1.25,1.75) 1

7.53 (0.60,0.64,0.83) (0.537,0.004,0.000) 3.00

(1.25,1.25,1.75) 5

7.53 (0.88,0,0.92)

(0.158,0.000,0.000) 10.03

(1.25,1.25,1.75) 10 7.53 (0.91,0,0.92)

(0.141,0.000,0.000) 20.04

(1.75,1.25,1.75) 1

6.55 (0.53,0.65,0.77) (0.246,0.003,0.000) 2.85

(1.75,1.25,1.75) 5

5.15 (0.36,0.22,0.91) (0.055,0.000,0.000) 6.58

(1.75,1.25,1.75) 10 7.53 (0.91,0,0.92)

(0.042,0.000,0.000) 20.04

(1.25,1.75,1.75) 1

7.53 (0.60,0.85,0.66) (0.537,0.000,0.001) 3.00

(1.25,1.75,1.75) 5

7.53 (0.88,0,0.92)

(0.158,0.000,0.000) 10.03

(1.25,1.75,1.75) 10 7.53 (0.91,0,0.92)

(0.141,0.000,0.000) 20.04

(1.75,1.75,1.75) 1

6.55 (0.53,0,0.69)

(0.246,0.000,0.001) 1.85

(1.75,1.75,1.75) 5

5.15 (0.36,0.22,0.91) (0.055,0.000,0.000) 6.58

(1.75,1.75,1.75) 10 7.53 (0.91,0,0.92)

(0.042,0.000,0.000) 20.04
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Table 4.17. Defender as Follower vs Three Adversaries with Log Utility Functions in Euclidean Distance
Euclidean
(a1 , a2 , a3 )

c

αe

(te1 , te2 , te3 )

(Ge1 , Ge2 , Ge3 )

−De

(4.0,4.0,4.0) 1

0.96 (0.44,0.60,0.76) (0.775,0.022,0.003) 2.76

(4.0,4.0,4.0) 5

0.88 (0.16,0,0.90)

(4.0,4.0,4.0) 10 0.98 (0.89,0,0.09)

(0.241,0.000,0.001) 6.15
(0.144,0.000,0.004) 10.15

(4.5,4.0,4.0) 1

0.97 (0.25,0.60,0.73) (0.616,0.022,0.005) 2.45

(4.5,4.0,4.0) 5

0.88 (0.16,0,0.90)

(0.232,0.000,0.001) 6.15

(4.5,4.0,4.0) 10 0.83 (0.04,0,0.91)

(0.117,0.000,0.000) 11.34

(4.0,4.5,4.0) 1

0.97 (0.50,0,0.66)

(0.778,0.000,0.013) 1.89

(4.0,4.5,4.0) 5

0.88 (0.16,0,0.90)

(0.241,0.000,0.001) 6.15

(4.0,4.5,4.0) 10 0.98 (0.89,0,0.09)

(0.144,0.000,0.004) 10.15

(4.5,4.5,4.0) 1

0.97 (0.27,0,0.67)

(0.628,0.000,0.011) 1.48

(4.5,4.5,4.0) 5

0.88 (0.16,0,0.90)

(0.232,0.000,0.001) 6.15

(4.5,4.5,4.0) 10 0.83 (0.04,0,0.91)

(0.117,0.000,0.000) 11.34

(4.0,4.0,4.5) 1

0.96 (0.44,0.60,0.76) (0.775,0.022,0.000) 2.76

(4.0,4.0,4.5) 5

0.88 (0.16,0,0.16)

(4.0,4.0,4.5) 10 0.98 (0.89,0,0.09)

(0.241,0.000,0.000) 1.17
(0.144,0.000,0.004) 10.15

(4.5,4.0,4.5) 1

0.97 (0.25,0.60,0.73) (0.616,0.022,0.000) 2.45

(4.5,4.0,4.5) 5

0.88 (0.16,0,0.16)

(4.5,4.0,4.5) 10 0.83 (0.04,0,0.91)

(0.232,0.000,0.000) 1.17
(0.117,0.000,0.000) 11.34

(4.0,4.5,4.5) 1

0.97 (0.50,0.66,0.05) (0.778,0.000,0.002) 1.89

(4.0,4.5,4.5) 5

0.88 (0.16,0,0.16)

(0.241,0.000,0.000) 1.17

(4.0,4.5,4.5) 10 0.98 (0.89,0,0.09)

(0.144,0.000,0.004) 10.15

(4.5,4.5,4.5) 1

0.97 (0.27,0,0.01)

(0.628,0.000,0.002) 0.49

(4.5,4.5,4.5) 5

0.88 (0.16,0,0.16)

(0.232,0.000,0.000) 1.17

(4.5,4.5,4.5) 10 0.83 (0.04,0,0.91)

(0.117,0.000,0.000) 11.34
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Table 4.18. Defender as Follower vs Three Adversaries with Log Utility Functions in Manhattan Distance
Manhattan
(a1 , a2 , a3 )

c

ηe

(te1 , te2 , te3 )

(Ge1 , Ge2 , Ge3 )

−De

(4.0,4.0,4.0) 1

6.76 (0.58,0,0.68)

(0.201,0.000,0.003) 1.97

(4.0,4.0,4.0) 5

7.53 (0.88,0,0.92)

(0.050,0.000,0.000) 10.03

(4.0,4.0,4.0) 10 7.53 (0.91,0,0.92)

(0.044,0.000,0.000) 20.04

(4.5,4.0,4.0) 1

6.55 (0.53,0,0.69)

(0.130,0.000,0.002) 1.85

(4.5,4.0,4.0) 5

5.46 (0.28,0.18,0.91) (0.042,0.000,0.000) 6.27

(4.5,4.0,4.0) 10 5.39 (0.11,0,0.92)

(0.019,0.000,0.000) 11.30

(4.0,4.5,4.0) 1

6.76 (0.58,0,0.68)

(0.201,0.000,0.003) 1.97

(4.0,4.5,4.0) 5

7.53 (0.88,0,0.92)

(0.050,0.000,0.000) 10.03

(4.0,4.5,4.0) 10 7.53 (0.91,0,0.92)

(0.044,0.000,0.000) 20.04

(4.5,4.5,4.0) 1

6.55 (0.53,0,0.69)

(0.130,0.000,0.002) 1.85

(4.5,4.5,4.0) 5

5.46 (0.28,0.18,0.91) (0.042,0.000,0.000) 6.27

(4.5,4.5,4.0) 10 5.39 (0.11,0,0.92)

(0.019,0.000,0.000) 11.30

(4.0,4.0,4.5) 1

6.76 (0.58,0,0.68)

(0.201,0.000,0.000) 1.97

(4.0,4.0,4.5) 5

7.53 (0.88,0,0.92)

(0.050,0.000,0.000) 10.03

(4.0,4.0,4.5) 10 7.53 (0.91,0,0.92)

(0.044,0.000,0.000) 20.04

(4.5,4.0,4.5) 1

6.55 (0.53,0,0.69)

(0.130,0.000,0.000) 1.852

(4.5,4.0,4.5) 5

5.46 (0.28,0.18,0.91) (0.042,0.000,0.000) 6.27

(4.5,4.0,4.5) 10 5.39 (0.11,0,0.92)

(0.019,0.000,0.000) 11.30

(4.0,4.5,4.5) 1

6.76 (0.58,0,0.68)

(0.201,0.000,0.000) 1.97

(4.0,4.5,4.5) 5

7.53 (0.88,0,0.92)

(0.050,0.000,0.000) 10.03

(4.0,4.5,4.5) 10 7.53 (0.91,0,0.92)

(0.044,0.000,0.000) 20.04

(4.5,4.5,4.5) 1

6.55 (0.53,0,0.69)

(0.130,0.000,0.000) 1.85

(4.5,4.5,4.5) 5

5.46 (0.28,0.18,0.91) (0.042,0.000,0.000) 6.27

(4.5,4.5,4.5) 10 5.39 (0.11,0,0.92)

(0.019,0.000,0.000) 11.30
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Table 4.19. Defender as Follower vs Three Adversaries with Exponential Utility Functions in Euclidean Distance
Euclidean
(a1 , a2 , a3 )

c

αe

(te1 , te2 , te3 )

(E1e , E2e , E3e )

−De

(0.25,0.25,0.25) 1

0.99 (0.75,0.67,0.59) (2.284,2.380,2.185) 3.02

(0.25,0.25,0.25) 5

0.99 (0.86,0.90,0.92) (1.701,0.312,0.187) 15.03

(0.25,0.25,0.25) 10 0.99 (0.89,0.90,0.93) (1.567,0.312,0.171) 30.03
(0.50,0.25,0.25) 1

0.99 (0.79,0.65,0.59) (0.277,2.584,2.185) 3.02

(0.50,0.25,0.25) 5

0.82 (0.27,0.89,0.91) (0.273,0.359,0.206) 11.53

(0.50,0.25,0.25) 10 0.99 (0.92,0.89,0.91) (0.157,0.359,0.206) 30.03
(0.25,0.50,0.25) 1

0.99 (0.61,0.12,0.62) (3.198,0.000,2.064) 2.02

(0.25,0.50,0.25) 5

0.99 (0.85,0,0.92)

(1.748,0.000,0.187) 10.03

(0.25,0.50,0.25) 10 0.99 (0.89,0,0.92)

(1.567,0.000,0.187) 20.03

(0.50,0.50,0.25) 1

0.96 (0.44,0,0.65)

(1.265,0.000,1.660) 1.76

(0.50,0.50,0.25) 5

0.82 (0.27,0,0.90)

(0.273,0.000,0.226) 6.53

(0.50,0.50,0.25) 10 0.99 (0.92,0,0.90)

(0.157,0.000,0.226) 20.03

(0.25,0.25,0.50) 1

0.99 (0.60,0.59,0.02) (3.237,3.061,0.005) 2.02

(0.25,0.25,0.50) 5

0.98 (0.86,0.90,0.15) (1.701,0.312,0.007) 10.15

(0.25,0.25,0.50) 10 0.99 (0.89,0.90,0.93) (1.567,0.312,0.000) 30.03
(0.50,0.25,0.50) 1

0.97 (0.50,0.62,0.77) (1.161,2.678,0.001) 2.89

(0.50,0.25,0.50) 5

0.90 (0.09,0.88,0.92) (0.223,0.412,0.000) 10.97

(0.50,0.25,0.50) 10 0.97 (0.91,0.89,0.15) (0.164,0.359,0.004) 20.21
(0.25,0.50,0.50) 1

0.99 (0.58,0.63,0.10) (3.269,0.000,0.009) 2.02

(0.25,0.50,0.50) 5

0.99 (0.85,0,0.04)

(1.748,0.000,0.006) 5.08

(0.25,0.50,0.50) 10 0.90 (0.89,0,0.32)

(1.567,0.000,0.005) 10.55

(0.50,0.50,0.50) 1

0.96 (0.45,0,0.67)

(1.269,0.000,0.005) 1.79

(0.50,0.50,0.50) 5

0.75 (0.35,0,0.91)

(0.275,0.000,0.000) 6.89

(0.50,0.50,0.50) 10 0.90 (0.89,0,0.32)

(0.179,0.000,0.005) 10.55
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A traditional clustering algorithm ﬁnds two clusters, a top one and a bottom one.
The bottom two distributions are not separable because they share a mixed region.
However, after applying GDClust, not only the neighbor regions of the labeled center
can be recognized and separated, the mixed region and outliers can also be marked.
In this example, we choose Gaussian as our kernel. Furthermore, we select two
diﬀerent weight scalars: if we choose a conservative weighting strategy (i.e., a smaller
weight scale k), we get more conservative labeled regions and a larger mixed region.
In this situation, we have smaller abnormal/normal regions and leave a large number
of points unlabeled. The unlabeled points can either from the larger mixed region or
from the outliers. In contrast, if we choose an aggressive weighting strategy (i.e., a
larger scalar k), we expect larger labeled sub-clusters and a smaller unlabeled mixed
region.
The clustering results are shown in Figure 4.13 and Figure 4.14: the blue, red, and
purple dots represent the normal, abnormal, mixed clusters identiﬁed by GDClust;
the black dots are the outliers. We point out that only GDClust can distinguish the
normal/abnormal clusters as well as the mixed region.

4.3.2

KDD Cup 1999 Data

The KDD cup 1999 data was initially created by MIT Lincoln Labs (108). The full
dataset contains about 126k labeled objects for training purpose and 25k unlabeled
objects for testing. Around 40 percent of the objects are network intrusion instances.
There are 41 features for each object. (109) ranked the 41 features with respect to
their eﬀectiveness in separating normal instances from abnormal instances. We use
the KDD Cup 99 data to demonstrate how our GDClust algorithm performs. We take
25192 instances from training set. We include top 7 continuous features according to
(109) for each instance.
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Table 4.20. Defender as Follower vs Three Adversaries with Exponential Utility Functions in Manhattan Distance
Manhattan
(a1 , a2 , a3 )

c

ηe

(te1 , te2 , te3 )

(E1e , E2e , E3e )

−De

(0.25,0.25,0.25) 1

7.53 (0.67,0.68,0.85) (1.359,0.402,0.091) 3.03

(0.25,0.25,0.25) 5

7.53 (0.89,0.92,0.93) (0.641,0.004,0.043) 15.03

(0.25,0.25,0.25) 10 7.53 (0.92,0.92,0.93) (0.580,0.004,0.043) 30.03
(0.50,0.25,0.25) 1

7.53 (0.79,0.68,0.68) (0.097,0.402,0.431) 3.03

(0.50,0.25,0.25) 5

7.53 (0.89,0.92,0.93) (0.063,0.004,0.043) 15.03

(0.50,0.25,0.25) 10 7.53 (0.93,0.93,0.92) (0.053,0.004,0.047) 30.03
(0.25,0.50,0.25) 1

7.53 (0.67,0.01,0.68) (1.359,0.000,0.431) 2.03

(0.25,0.50,0.25) 5

7.53 (0.89,0.01,0.93) (0.641,0.000,0.043) 10.03

(0.25,0.50,0.25) 10 7.53 (0.92,0.01,0.93) (0.580,0.000,0.043) 20.04
(0.50,0.50,0.25) 1

7.53 (0.61,0.01,0.68) (0.241,0.000,0.431) 2.00

(0.50,0.50,0.25) 5

7.53 (0.92,0.01,0.91) (0.055,0.000,0.052) 10.03

(0.50,0.50,0.25) 10 7.53 (0.93,0.01,0.92) (0.053,0.000,0.047) 20.04
(0.25,0.25,0.50) 1

7.53 (0.67,0.68,0.14) (1.359,0.402,0.000) 2.07

(0.25,0.25,0.50) 5

7.53 (0.89,0.92,0.93) (0.641,0.004,0.000) 15.03

(0.25,0.25,0.50) 10 7.53 (0.92,0.92,0.93) (0.580,0.004,0.000) 30.03
(0.50,0.25,0.50) 1

7.53 (0.61,0.68,0.84) (0.241,0.402,0.000) 3.00

(0.50,0.25,0.50) 5

7.53 (0.89,0.92,0.93) (0.063,0.004,0.000) 15.03

(0.50,0.25,0.50) 10 7.53 (0.92,0.92,0.93) (0.055,0.004,0.000) 30.03
(0.25,0.50,0.50) 1

7.53 (0.67,0.01,0.64) (1.359,0.000,0.003) 2.02

(0.25,0.50,0.50) 5

7.53 (0.89,0.01,0.93) (0.641,0.000,0.000) 10.03

(0.25,0.50,0.50) 10 7.53 (0.92,0.01,0.93) (0.580,0.000,0.000) 20.04
(0.50,0.50,0.50) 1

6.55 (0.54,0.01,0.70) (0.320,0.000,0.001) 1.85

(0.50,0.50,0.50) 5

7.53 (0.89,0.01,0.93) (0.063,0.000,0.000) 10.03

(0.50,0.50,0.50) 10 7.53 (0.92,0.01,0.93) (0.055,0.000,0.000) 20.04
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Figure 4.13. The simulated clustering experiments with diﬀerent
weight scalars and conﬁdence levels. Weight k = 10 and α = 0.79
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Figure 4.14. The simulated clustering experiments with diﬀerent
weight scalars and conﬁdence levels. Weight k = 50, α = 0.87
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Figure 4.15. Diﬀerent quantitative measures as the weight scalar k
increases from 1 to 100. Top panel is the pureness rate of abnormal
clusters and bottom panel is the pureness rate of normal clusters.
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Figure 4.16. Diﬀerent quantitative measures as the weight scalar k
increases from 1 to 100. Top panel is the abnormal rate of mixed
region and bottom panel is the abnormal rate of outliers

81

560
540
520
500
0

20

40

60

80

100

0

20

40

60

80

100

5000
4500
4000
3500

Figure 4.17. Diﬀerent quantitative measures as the weight scalar k
increases from 1 to 100. Top panel is the number of points in mixed
region and bottom panel is the number of points as outliers.
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Figure 4.18. The boxplots of success rates for Manhattan defensive
walls with diﬀerent α levels and weight scalars. The corresponding
η(α) values are 5.89, 7.25, 8.97, 11.51, 13.72;
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Figure 4.19. The boxplots of success rates for Euclidean defensive
walls with diﬀerent α levels and weight scalars.
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In the ﬁrst experiment, in a single run, we randomly sample 150 instances and keep
their labels. The rest are treated as unlabeled instances in the run. We perform 100
runs. Now when an overwhelming majority (over 99%) of the instances are unlabeled,
it becomes an unsupervised learning problem.
We gradually increase the weight k from 1 to 100. Along with the increasing
weight, we ﬁnd that the rate of successfully labeled abnormal objects goes up, but
the error rate of the normal raises as well, which is consistent with our simulated
experiment. It is expected because if the weight increases, we have less unlabeled
points. As a result, it is a more aggressive clustering strategy. Meanwhile, the
normal clusters’ region increases and it includes more points which are more likely to
be mis-labeled abnormal objects. Therefore, we have a trade-oﬀ in choosing weight
scalar k. It is a trade-oﬀ between the size of the labeled regions and the error rate of
mis-labeled points.
In Figure 4.15, Figure 4.16 and Figure 4.17, we observe that our pureness range
of the abnormal clusters (i.e., correctly labeled abnormal instances) are from 90%
to 92.32%, which means with the increase of the weight, more abnormal objects are
correctly included in the abnormal clusters. Meanwhile, the pureness rate of normal
clusters (i.e., correctly labeled normal instances) decreases as weight goes up. The
changes are more signiﬁcant for weight smaller than 10. Because the actual number
of instances in normal clusters are more than abnormal clusters, the overall error
rates increases. In the current situation, the elbow point is at weight scalar k = 15.
Furthermore, the number of points in mixed regions and outliers decreases as we have
a larger weight. The elbow point is at weight scalar k = 15 as well. k = 15 is the
optimal trade-oﬀ value in this experiment. The abnormal rate of outliers are from
76% to 73% as the weight scalar increases, which means we have to exam the outliers
carefully.
In a second experiment, we draw two boxplots to show the success rate within the
defensive walls (i.e., correctly labeled normal instances within the wall) as shown in
Figure 4.18 and Figure 4.19. We again have 100 runs. For each run, we randomly
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select 100 points to have labels. Based on the labels, we perform GDClust to cluster
instances. Then we set diﬀerent weight scalars and examine diﬀerent alpha levels for
the defensive walls. We set k to 1, 30 and 50 as low, medium and high weight scalars.
For each of the weight, we compare the success rates for the two types of defensive
walls.
We set α levels from 0.6 to 0.95. The median of the success rates varies from
0.85 to 0.87. We ﬁnd that the weight scalars k = 30 and k = 50 perform better
than k = 1 in term of clustering success rate. Furthermore, α = 0.8 has the highest
median success rate for Manhattan defensive walls and α = 0.7 has the highest median
success rate for Euclidean defensive walls. Both of the results are consistent with the
recommended α range, 0.7 to 0.9, from the game theoretic studies.
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5. DYNAMIC BAYESIAN UPDATE FOR PROFILING
CLUSTERING
5.1

Motivation
When we consider the streaming adversary clustering problem, the methods and

types of adversaries may evovle from time to time. As a result, the defensive system
has to adjust the defender strategy accordingly. There are very few papers talk about
adversary clustering and none of them considers this senario. Since we have some
information about past adversary features and normal user bahaviors, we can treat
those behaviors as the prior knowledge of the clusters. As more and more data is fed
in, we can use the Bayesian posterior as the clustering forecast and provide update
for the clustering result. Then we are able to do clustering based on a small amount
of historical labeled data and make the model more accurate when more data is fed
in. (2) We will ﬁrst take a movie toy example to start.

5.2

Method

5.2.1

Dynamic Linear Model

Dynamic linear model (DLM) is a special case of state space model. We can start
from a multiple linear regression
Y = θX + 
where Y is the response variable and X is a set of explanatory variable; θ is the
coeﬃcient of the predictors and  ∼ N (0, σ) is the error. However, when there is a

87
time-varying trend in the predictor coeﬃcient, we can adjust our model to ﬁt it. The
model changes to
Yt = θt Xt + vt
where t is the time and vt ∼ N (0, Vt ). In our particular case, we consider the movie’s
rating and average theater revenue as time-varying predictive variables, and the daily
box oﬃce as response variable. Thus, θt = (θRt , θP t ) and Xt = (Rt , Pt )T
Then, we assume the coeﬃcient state θt can change as time evolves, which means:
θt = βt θt−1 + wt
where βt is the change rate of the evolving state and wt is the error which follows
wt ∼ N (0, Wt ).
Thus, we are able to conclude a generalized form for dynamic linear model:
Yt = θt Xt + vt
θt = Gt θt−1 + wt
where Yt is the response variables’ observation, Xt is the predictive variables’ value,
θt is the coeﬃcient of the Xt , and vt ,wt are the standard errors for two equations.
In this model, we treat θt as a special term of hidden states. Instead of a discrete
states’ set, it has an inﬁnity number of states where follows a distribution, which can
be speciﬁed. The state changes as time evolves. As a result, it can be easily transformed into other regression or time series models by specifying the state switching
coeﬃcient Gt .
For our box oﬃce prediction case, one important treatment is how to deal with
the seasonality: the audience have a diﬀerent viewing desire on diﬀerent weekdays.
As a result, our model has to be ﬂexible to ﬁt the weekdays’ diﬀerent movie viewing
demand. Furthermore, other predictive variables’ coeﬃcients, like ratings, may vary
from day to day since they are diﬀerent types of audience. We design our model to
ﬁt the weekdays’ eﬀects as follows:
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5.2.2

Seasonal Eﬀect

In time series analysis, seasonality presents the variability which occurs at speciﬁc regular intervals. Normally those intervals are less than a year, such as weekly,
monthly or quarterly (110). Seasonality may be caused by various factors like vacation, holidays, climate and economy. It contains repetitive periodic and predictable
patterns in time series models.
If we assume there is a seasonal eﬀect in the dynamic linear model, it can be speciﬁed in the state change equation. if we consider there is an additional autocorrelation
inside of the regression coeﬃcient θt , which is:
θt = θt−s + wt
where s is the number of periods in a seasonal cycle. In our box oﬃce prediction case,
we need to specify it as 7 days. We can also generalize the model to the GLM form
as follows:
θt = Gθt−1 + wt
where

⎡

0

⎢
⎢
⎢ 1
⎢
⎢
G=⎢ 0
⎢
⎢
⎢. . .
⎣
0

0

...

0

0

...

0

1

...

0

...

...

...

0

...

1

1

⎤

⎥
⎥
0⎥
⎥
⎥
0⎥
⎥
⎥
. . .⎥
⎦
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θt = [θt1 , . . . , θts ]T
and
wt ∼ N (0, Wt ).
Here, matrix G can be considered as a rotator to push the correct seasonal coeﬃcient
into the model. Thus, the full model can be denoted as follows:
Yt = θt Xt + vt
θt = Gθt−1 + wt
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The advantage of this model is that we can give a fair estimate based on the historical
big data and iteratively improve the model by feeding the updated data into the
system.

5.3

Parameter Inference

5.3.1

Conjugate Bayesian Inference

After designing the structure of the model, we have to know how to calculate the
initial value of the all the model’s coeﬃcients. Furthermore, we also need to know how
to update the models’ parameters as new data fed in. There are several ways(111) to
do the inference for DLM, like maximum likelihood estimation, conjugagte bayesian
inference or Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC). In this paper, we only discuss
about the conjugate Bayesian inference. It is because in most of the cases, we have
a big set of historical data, and those historical data can be served as our prior
information to increase the prediction precision. Furthermore, conjugate Bayesian
inference has explicit analytical solution, so the computational cost of the inference is
the lowest and it provide the possibility of scalable inference for the model in big data
scenario. Finally, the assumption of the conjugate Bayesian is mild and reasonable
for most of practical cases, especially good for the cases with less parameters and
need to do optimization in the next step.
We consider the generalized form of our GLM model as follows:
Yt = θt Xt + vt
θt = Gt θt−1 + wt
where vt ∼ N (0, Vt ) and wt ∼ N (0, Wt ) and t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , T .
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We assume that the variance term Vt and Wt are unknown but they share a
˜ t . Based on the
common scale factor σ 2 , which satisﬁes Vt = σ 2 V˜t and Wt = σ 2 W
properties of DLM, we can turn our model into
Yt | θt , σ 2 ∼ Nm (Ft θt , V˜t )
˜ t)
θt | θt−1 , σ 2 ∼ Np (Gt θt−1 , W
Then, we have to choose a prior for the unknown parameters (σ 2 , θ0 ). It is convenient
to choose a conjugate Normal-Inverse-Gamma (NIG) prior, which is
σ 2 ∼ IG(α0 , β0 )
θ0 | σ 2 ∼ N (m0 , C0 )
where m0 is the mean of θ0 and C0 is the conditional variance. Here, we also assume
that C0 share the same σ 2 with Vt and Wt , which is C0 = σ 2 C̃0 . Then the NIG prior
turns to be:
σ 2 ∼ IG(α0 , β0 )
θ0 | σ 2 ∼ N (m0 , σ 2 C̃0 )
We can put the Normal-Inverse-Gamma distribution together. The distribution of
(θ0 , σ 2 ) is denoted by
(θ0 , σ 2 ) ∼ N IG(m0 , C̃0 , α0 , β0 )

5.3.2

Filtering

After setting up the initial stage, we can update the parameters by iterative ﬁltering: if we assume
θt−1 , σ 2 | y1:t−1 ∼ N IG(mt−1 , C˜t−1 , αt−1 , βt−1 )
where t ≥ 1.

91
Then, by directly applying Kalman ﬁlter, it is easy to update the one-step-ahead
density of θt , σ 2 | y1:t−1 . The density should be updated as follows:
˜ t , αt−1 , βt−1 )
θt , σ 2 | y1:t−1 ∼ N IG(at , R
˜ t = Gt C̃t−1 G0 + W̃t .
where at = Gt mt and R
t
The posterior prediction Yt | σ 2 , y1:t−1 follows Gaussian distribution:
Yt | σ 2 , y1:t−1 ∼ N (ft , Qt )
where ft = Ft at and Qt = σ 2 Q̃t = σ 2 Ft R̃t Ft0 + Ṽt
Next step, we have to update the distribution of θt , σ 2 | y1:t . For a new observation
yt , the likelihood is
yt | θt , σ 2 ∼ N (Ft θt , σ 2 Ṽt ).
Then we can directly apply the Bayesian inference for linear regression which is
(θt , σ 2 | y1:t ) ∼ N IG(mt , C˜t , αt , βt )
where
mt = at + R̃t Ft Q̃−1 (yt − ft )
0
C̃t = R̃t − R̃t Ft0 Q̃−1
t R̃t
m
αt = αt−1 +
2
1
βt = βt−1 + (yt − ft )0 Q̃−1
t (yt − ft )
2

The procedure can be performed iteratively until all the available time series
information is fed in.

5.3.3

Discount Factor

There is always a debate(111) on whether we shall trust more on the Bayesian
prior or the latest updated data. If we trust more on the prior, it can avoid some
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unusual behaviors’ eﬀect; however, if we value more on the new data, it can correct
the bias from the prior. In the DLM model, Wt is the crucial part in determining
the reliability of the Bayesian prior in forecasting. If Wt is large, from the formula
θt = Gt θt−1 + wt , we can easily ﬁnd that there is a high uncertainty when we pass
from θt−1 to θt , and the forecasting of yt has little relevance to θt−1 . It means that
in this kind of setting, we trust more on the new data, as the θt is more sensitive to
the new data. In the contrast, if Wt is small, we pass more information from θt−1 to
θt and yt has a high relevance to the prior information, which means that we trust
more on the prior information.
Considering the inference of the conditional variance θt . If given y1:t−1 and Rt =
Gt Ct−1 G0t + Wt , we can decide how much information we want to pass from Pt =
Gt Ct−1 G0t to Rt . We can introduce a parameter δ, which follows that Pt = δRt , where
0 < δ ≤ 1. Then, Wt can be expressed as a proportion to Pt :
Wt =

1−δ
Pt
δ

If δ = 0, it means that there is no error in the state equation θt = Gt θt−1 . Otherwise,
Pt is always increasing in Rt = Pt +Wt , which means that the uncertainty is increasing
as the time evolving and the loss is a proportion with respect to Wt
According to (74), δ is called discount factor because it ”discounts” the matrix Pt
that it has a deterministic state evolution into the matrix Rt . In practice, Petris in
(111) suggests that the value of the discount factor is usually chosen between 0.9 and
0.99. It can also selected by diﬀerent model selection criteria like selecting the best
predictive performance of the model in cross-validation process.

5.3.4

Elasticity and Price Optimization

If we propose a demand-price relationship model, the next question is how to set a
price which is the most proﬁtable for the sellers. Generally speaking, when the price
goes up, the demand will drop down; and the demand increases when the price falls.
The revenue R = Q × P where Q is the demand and P is the price. The optimal
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price for the seller is when it maximizes the revenue. We need a measure to show
when the maximum revenue is reached.
As a result, we introduce the term of price elasticity of demand (112), in short of
elasticity. Elasticity is a measurement in economics which presents the ratio of the
percentage change between price and demand. It can be expressed in the following
equation:
dQ/Q
dP/P
where Q is the demand and P is the price; dQ/Q and dP/P are the changing rate
E=

of the demand and price. Elasiticity describes the percentage change in quantity
which responses to a one percent change in price. From the equation we can ﬁnd that
revenue is maximized when elasticity equals exactly one. As a result, we are able
to solve the optimal price based on a DLM price-demand regression by setting the
elasticity to one.
If the demand and price is in a Linear-Linear relationship, which can be expressed
as Q = θ0 + θp P , where θp is the price coeﬃcients. The elasiticity can be solved as:
Eo =

dQ P
P
= θp
dP Q
Q

where θp is the price’s coeﬃcient. Then, the optimal price is:
P =

θp
Q

If the demand and price is in a Log-Linear relationship, which can be expressed
as log(Q) = θ0 + θp P . The optimal price can be solved as:
Eo =

dQ P
dP Q

= θp exp{θ0 + θp P }
= θp Q

P
Q

= θp P
Then the optimal price will be
P =

1
θp

P
Q
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Figure 5.1. Simulation Study: We assume this is a monthly eﬀect
and deﬁne the seasonal pattern with a length of 12. In this plot,
the simulated data is shown in blue dash line and the prediction is
shown in red solid line. We can observe that our model can catch the
annual incremental and seasonal trend. The mean absolute percentage
error(MAPE) is 0.608%.
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5.4

Simulation Study
In order to test the performance of our model, we design a simulation study for

the model. If we want to compare the performance of other time series model like
seasonal ARIMA (113) with Baysian DLM, we generate a dataset based on a seasonal
ARIMA model. In this simulated dataset, we set a seasonal pattern with a length
of 12, it also has an order 2 autoregression. Furthermore, It has an incremental of
N (0.1, 0.01) from cycle to cycle. Then, we ﬁt the data with our model and check
whether our DLM model can predict the trend of the simulated data.
First, we need to generate a reliable Bayesian prior for the parameters. Thus, We
use ﬁrst year data to train the prior and warm start our next step inference.
In the model, we set the period as 12 and set the order of DLM as 2. The model
can be shown as:
log Yt = θt + vt
θt = Gt θt−1 + wt
where Yt is the number of passengers, and Gt is the matrix for the seasonal coeﬃcient
selection.
The initial variance is the variance of ﬁrst 12 data points. By applying the updates
and ﬁlter we described before, the model ﬁtting result is shown as ﬁgure 5.1. We are
able to observe that the forecasting can easily adjust the prediction and ﬁt the seasonal
trend. It can also catch the incremental as the new data feed in. We calculate the
mean absolute percentage error (MAPE), which is 0.608%.

5.5

Box Oﬃce Prediction and the Number of Theaters Recommendation
We use the box oﬃce data(90) (114) (115) as described before. The model we

proposed for the data as follows:
log Dt = β0t + βst St + βpt Pt + vt
θt = Gt θt−1 + wt
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Figure 5.2. Harry Potter and the Order of the Phoenix and its daily
revenue prediction: In this plot, the movie’s log transformed actual
daily revenue is shown as the red solid line, our daily revenue prediction by DLM is shown as the green dot line and the daily revenue
prediction by SARIMA is shown as the blue dash line. We are able
to observe that our predictions can fairly ﬁt the movie’s trend except for the ﬁrst two Thursdays and the closing dates of the movie.
Thursdays’ lack of ﬁt is because that movie theaters adjust their number of screens on Thursdays; we are unable to ﬁt the closing dates
also because of the unusual trends. However, the Thursdays’ trend
gets gradually picked up. The overall mean absolute percentage error
(MAPE) is 2.53% On the other hand, the traditional SARIMA model
cannot make prediction in the begining because the lack of data. The
overall MAPE for SARIMA is 6.11%
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where β0 is the opening day’s eﬀect for the particular title, Dt is the daily per theater
revenue, St is the number of theaters, Pt is the daily rating of the movie, βs and βp
are the coeﬃcent for St and Pt , θt = (β0t , βst , βpt )T and Gt is the coeﬃcient matrix of
each weekday’s eﬀect, which is:
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We ﬁrst apply a linear regression model based on the historical data. We use
Time Dirks (116) main movie genres categories to divide the movies into 11 major
genres. Based on the linear regression model, we can grab an approximate prior for
each movie type. We also treat the opening month as another covariate in the model.
Then, the prior of the other covariates’ coeﬃcients can also be learned from the linear
regression model.
In order to validate the we pick ”Harry Potter and the Order of the Phoenix” as an
example. We apply the prior as discribed before and use cross-validation to ﬁnd the
best discount factor 0.98. By applying the inference method and the ﬁltering process,
the ﬁtting result is shown as ﬁgure 5.2. The red solid line is the prediction for the log
transformed daily revenue per theater and the blue dash line is the model’s prediction.
It is easy to observe from the plot that in the begining the ﬁtting curve cannot catch
the trend on Thursday very well. It is because the movie theaters always adjusts the
number of theaters for this movie on Thursday. The infomation cannot be directly
learned from the prior information. However, after 3 weeks, the trend can be catched
pretty well. By the end of the trend, there should have a increase on Friday. However,
lots of movie theater removed it because the contract issue. Thus, after an increase on
the last Thursday, we cannot get an good estimate in the ﬁnal trend. Meanwhile, in
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Figure 5.3. Harry Potter and the Order of the Phoenix’s Daily Elasticity: This plot shows the elasticity changes as time evolving. The
black solid line is the movie’s elasticity and the red dash line is the
optimal elasticity which is one. We can observe that the actual plan
setting swing around the optimal elasticity.
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Figure 5.4. Harry Potter and the Order of the Phoenix’s Optimal
Number of Theaters: In this plot, the actual number of theaters is
shown as red solid line and the optimal number of theaters is shown as
green dash line. The number of theaters is optimal when the elasticity
is set to be one. If we set the number of theater to be the optimal
one, it is expected to be a 7% increase in total box oﬃce revenue.
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order to compare the performance with existing models, we picked the most common
model for time series analysis: Seasonal autoregressive integratred moving average
model (SARIMA) (117) to compare with our model in term of performance. The
prediction of SARIMA is shown as green dot line in ﬁgure 5.2. SARIMA is a time
series model considers the autocorrelation, linear combination, seasonality and the
periodical changes together. However, the method requires enough data to infer the
parameters in the model. If we do not have data, we are unable to make prediction.
As a result, in the beginning of the SARIMA forecast, we do not have prediction
available. After a couple of days, we begin to have some SARIMA prediction which
does not perform as well as our DLM forecast. The overall mean absolute percentage
error (MAPE) for DLM is 2.53%, while the counterpart for SARIMA is 6.11%.
Then, we are able to optimize the number of screen. Because we use a log-linear
demand-price relationship in this model, according to our previous discussion, we
shall apply
Et = θ t

St
Dt

Sopt =

1
θt

and

to optimize the numbers of the theaters. Figure 5.3 presents the daily elasticity, and
Figure 5.4 plots the actual and optimal number of theaters for each day, where the
red solid line is the actual number of theaters and the blue dash line is the optimal
number of theaters. Genernal speaking, if the elasticity is less than one, it means that
the number of theaters are less than the number which is needed. On the other hand,
if the elasticity is greater than one, it means some of the theaters may not meet the
optimal capacity. As a result, we can calculate the optimal number of the theaters
when we set the elasticity equals to one.
From Figure 5.4, we can see that the optimal number of theaters are around the
actual number of theaters. If the theaters took the optimal number of the theaters,
the movie can collect about 7% more revenue than the actual number of the theaters.
However, in reality, the theaters cannot change its showtime everyday. They have
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to make a plan at least for one week. The optimization for this movie is relatively
accurate according to our model.
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6. CONCLUSION
In this thesis, we develop three model-based clustering algorithms on three types of
data and applied them to several applications. Those algorithms could be extended
to other applications. The algorithms are as follows:
In the beginning of the thesis, we develop a nonparametric time varying model
to cluster user activity data. With the fact that we have to focus on users’ activity
pattern rather than users’ day to day output. Furthermore users’ activity pattern
may evolve from time to time, so no existing clustering algorithm is able to segment
users into subgroups. The model we developed is based on hidden Markov model with
a spline interpolation to approximate the underlying unknown user activity pattern
function. The clustering algorithm is to divide the users into groups based on their
similarity of activity pattern model. By applying this algorithm, we are able to cluster
GitHub and Wikipedia user activity data and identify their behavior patterns.
Then, we introduce the adversarial clustering clustering algorithm, a.k.a. GDClust, to separate the attack sub-clusters and the normal sub-clusters within big
mixed clusters created by adversaries’ attack objects. With too few labeled instances,
we cannot build an eﬀective classiﬁer, which has a clearly deﬁned classiﬁcation boundary to defend the normal population from the attack objects. However utilizing the
few labeled objects, our defensive clustering algorithm can identify the overlapping
area between the normal sub-cluster and the attack sub-cluster. Instead of a classiﬁer boundary, an overlapping area is similar to a conﬁdence region, reﬂecting the
strength of the attack. Furthermore defensive walls are drawn inside dense normal
sub-clusters. This is a conservative strategy to defend against active adversaries. All
objects outside the core position of the normal objects need to be examined carefully.
In the end of the thesis, one hybrid modeling method combining DLM and Bayesian
theory, is proposed for forecasting movie box oﬃce revenue. The uniqueness of the
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proposed DLM is that model coeﬃcients are dynamically updatable with properly
selected prior information, such that the model can precisely capture patterns in
time series box oﬃce data by using a big historical movie dataset. In addition, the
method also applies smoothing technique for circumventing issues of seasonality and
increment. Experimentation on sample movie box oﬃce data prove the eﬃcacy of the
proposed method.
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